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INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he war between disparate impact and equal protection will be 
waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about 
how—and on what terms—to make peace between them.”1  This Article 
addresses Justice Scalia’s premonition in Ricci v. DeStefano2 by 
providing an analysis of how that war may be waged and whether peace 
can be made between Title VII’s disparate impact provision and the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
Ricci involved a challenge to the City of New Haven’s decision to 
void the test results of an examination required for promotion within the 
City’s fire department.  Firefighters were required to pass the 
examination to qualify for promotion to the rank of lieutenant or 
captain.  In 2003, 118 firefighters took the examination.3 
The test adversely affected African-American firefighters, who 
passed the examination at a lower rate than Caucasian firefighters.  
Twenty-five out of forty-three Caucasians, six out of nineteen African-
Americans, and three out of fifteen Hispanics who took the lieutenant 
examination passed.4  Sixteen out of twenty-five Caucasians, three out 
of eight African-Americans, and three out of eight Hispanics who took 
the captain examination passed.5 
Because of the disproportionate number of African-American 
firefighters who failed the test, the City feared that it would be subject 
to discrimination lawsuits6 under the disparate impact provision of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7  Disparate impact focuses on the 
results of employment decisions and imposes liability when 
employment practices cause a disparate impact on the basis of race or 
any other protected class.8  Under the “four-fifths” or “80%” rule 
promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
through the Uniform Guidelines, adverse impact can be shown when the 
pass rate for any racial group is less than four-fifths of the pass rate of 
 
1. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2683 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 2664 (majority opinion). 
4. Id. at 2666. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 2664. 
7. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(2), 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2008)). 
8. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that Congress intended to 
focus on the consequences of employment decisions). 
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the most successful group.9  An employer may be liable for disparate 
impact even when the employer lacks any intent to discriminate,10 
whereas disparate treatment liability rests on proving employer intent.11  
“The City was faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact 
liability”12 because the pass rates for the Hispanic and African-
American test takers fell below the 80% rule.13  Consequently, the City 
refused to certify the tests and thereby voided the results.14 
As it turned out, the City found itself stuck between Title VII’s 
disparate impact and disparate treatment provisions.  Although it 
avoided discrimination lawsuits from African-American firefighters for 
the disparate impact of the examination, in the end, the City was sued 
by seventeen Caucasian firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter15 who 
passed the examination and believed they would have likely been 
promoted if the test results were used.16  The plaintiff firefighters 
contended that the City violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the disparate treatment provision of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17  The Title VII and Equal 
Protection claims rested on the assertion that by voiding the test results, 
the City intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs based on 
race.18 
 
9. The “four-fifths rule” or “80% rule” functions in the following way: 
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or 
eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded 
by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater 
than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as 
evidence of adverse impact. Smaller differences in selection rate may nevertheless 
constitute adverse impact, where they are significant in both statistical and practical 
terms or where a user’s actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately on 
grounds of race, sex, or ethnic group. 
U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2008). 
10. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (stating that even good intentions are immaterial when 
mechanisms are unrelated to job capacity and adversely affect minorities). 
11. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805–07 (1973) (stating that the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s reason for refusing to hire was “discriminatory in 
its application”). 
12. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677–78 (2009). 
13. On the lieutenant examination, the pass rate for each racial group was the following: 
58.1% for Caucasians, 31.6% for African-Americans, and 20% for Hispanics.  On the captain 
examination, the pass rate for Caucasians was 64% and for Hispanics and African-Americans was 
37.5%.  Id. at 2678. 
14. Id. at 2664. 
15. Id. at 2671. 
16. Id. at 2664. 
17. Id. at 2671. 
18. Id. 
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The Supreme Court held that the City violated the disparate treatment 
provision by invalidating the tests because of their adverse impact on 
African-Americans.19  In order to be justified in voiding the test results, 
the City was required to show a “strong basis in evidence” for a 
potential disparate impact violation.20  The Court found no such basis.21  
Although the Court reconciled the tension between Title VII’s disparate 
impact and disparate treatment provisions, the Court sidestepped the 
constitutional question of whether Title VII’s disparate impact provision 
may cause an employer to violate an employee’s constitutional right to 
Equal Protection.22  The Court’s failure to resolve the tension between 
Title VII’s disparate impact provision and the Equal Protection Clause 
prompted Justice Scalia’s prediction of an impending war between the 
two.  Justice Scalia feared that “[the Court’s] resolution of this dispute 
merely postpone[d] the evil day on which the Court will have to 
confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-
impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent 
with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?”23 
The war that Justice Scalia foreshadowed might not be too distant.  In 
the term following Ricci, the Court decided Lewis v. City of Chicago, 
which involved a disparate impact claim by African-Americans 
challenging the city’s hiring procedures for its fire department.24  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the city’s use of test scores to hire firefighters had 
a disproportionate adverse effect on African-Americans.25  Although the 
Court did not decide whether the plaintiffs adequately proved their 
claim, the Court held that they stated a cognizable claim.26  The Court 
relied on Ricci to conclude that “a plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
disparate-impact claim by showing that the employer ‘uses a particular 
employment practice that causes a disparate impact’ on one of the 
 
19. Id. at 2681. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. The Court stated: 
Our statutory holding does not address the constitutionality of the measures taken here 
in purported compliance with Title VII. We also do not hold that meeting the strong-
basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in a future case.  
As we explain below, because respondents have not met their burden under Title VII, 
we need not decide whether a legitimate fear of disparate impact is ever sufficient to 
justify discriminatory treatment under the Constitution. 
Id. at 2676. 
23. Id. at 2681–82 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
24. 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2010). 
25. Id. at 2196. 
26. Id. at 2198. 
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prohibited bases.”27  This case is likely to lead to an increase in 
disparate impact claims,28 and soon the disparate impact provision may 
have to reckon with the Equal Protection Clause. 
This Article examines the constitutional question left open by the 
Court in Ricci, by exploring the possible outcomes when the war that 
Justice Scalia predicted is waged.  Professor Richard Primus first noted 
the conflict between Title VII’s disparate impact provision and Equal 
Protection29 in his seminal article cited by Justice Scalia in Ricci.30  
Recent works have responded to Ricci’s statutory implications, but none 
has given extensive treatment to the constitutional issue since Professor 
Primus.31  This Article seeks to answer the constitutional question—
whether Title VII’s disparate impact provision violates the Equal 
Protection Clause by requiring employers to consider race in their 
employment practices.  Under Equal Protection jurisprudence, racial 
classifications trigger strict scrutiny and are permitted only if necessary 
to serve a compelling purpose.32  This Article seeks to test Title VII’s 
disparate impact provision under strict scrutiny to determine if it can 
survive an Equal Protection challenge.  This Article’s focus is to 
provide an extensive search for a compelling purpose that may justify 
the racial classifications that are required under Title VII’s disparate 
impact provision.33  Specifically, this Article evaluates six compelling 
purposes that may be asserted to defend Title VII’s disparate impact 
provision under an Equal Protection Clause challenge and anticipates 
the attacks that may be lodged against those defenses.  In so doing, the 
 
27. Id. at 2197 (emphasis omitted). 
28. The city warned that “[e]mployers may face new disparate-impact suits for practices they 
have used regularly for years.”  Id. at 2200. 
29. Professor Primus was the first to explore the tension between Title VII’s disparate impact 
provision and the Equal Protection Clause, but there had been other discussions concerning the 
Equal Protection Clause and facially neutral acts with discriminatory effects.  See Richard A. 
Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 494 
(2003).  Professor Primus described the first round of legal questions as centering on whether 
facially neutral state action that had a discriminatory effect but lacked a discriminatory intent 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 494–95.  The issue that arose in the second round 
involved whether Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause could 
validate facially neutral laws that prohibited practices with racially disparate impact.  Id. at 495. 
30. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
31. One commentator has briefly taken up the issue in reviewing the Ricci opinion.  See 
generally Kenneth L. Marcus, The War between Disparate Impact and Equal Protection, 2009 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 53, 55 (2008–2009) (arguing that equal protection is consistent with 
disparate impact only when impact is narrowly construed). 
32. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
33. A discussion of whether disparate impact satisfies strict scrutiny’s second prong—whether 
disparate impact’s use of racial classifications is narrowly tailored—is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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inquiry should not be interpreted as hostility toward affirmative action; 
the Article makes no normative arguments on the subject.  Rather, the 
focus of this work is on a discussion of how Title VII disparate impact 
fits within the analytic framework of the Equal Protection Clause, as it 
specifically relates to race.  A discussion about other forms of disparate 
impact is also beyond the scope of this Article.34 
Part I of this Article traces the development of disparate impact 
theory and its codification, the development of strict scrutiny, and the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of cases involving Equal Protection Clause 
challenges against governmental use of racial classifications.  
Additionally, Part I discusses the ways that disparate impact implicates 
racial classifications by centering liability on racial proportions and 
forcing employers to consider race in making employment decisions.  
Consequently, Part I concludes that disparate impact is likely to be 
subject to strict scrutiny.  Part II briefly explores whether there is a 
theoretical conflict between Title VII’s disparate impact provision and 
the Equal Protection Clause and concludes they are symmetrical in their 
focus on protecting individuals, as opposed to groups. 
Part III explores whether there is a doctrinal conflict between Title 
VII’s disparate impact provision and Equal Protection.  Operating on 
the assumption that the disparate impact provision implicates racial 
classifications, this Part examines six rationales that may be asserted as 
compelling interests to defend the provision against an Equal Protection 
challenge: (1) remedying past discrimination; (2) smoking out 
discrimination (intentional or unconscious); (3) obtaining the benefits of 
diversity; (4) providing role models; (5) satisfying an operational need; 
and (6) providing equal employment opportunity by removing barriers.  
This Part analyzes whether case law and empirical evidence support 
each rationale.  Part III also explores how each rationale can be applied 
in the employment context to serve as a compelling interest for Title 
VII’s disparate impact provision and provides a critique of each 
justification.  Finally, this Article concludes that five of the six 
rationales are inadequate to serve as a compelling interest that can 
justify the disparate impact provision’s use of a “highly suspect tool” 
like racial classifications.35  The disparate impact provision, however, is 
 
34. Disparate impact can also occur when an employment practice causes a disparate impact 
on the basis of color, religion, sex, or national origin.  See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 
241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2008)). 
35. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (explaining that the 
purpose of strict scrutiny is to assure that the legislative goal is important enough to warrant racial 
classifications). 
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most likely to survive strict scrutiny by serving the compelling purpose 
of removing barriers to provide equal employment opportunities. 
I.  SURVEYING THE BATTLEFIELD TERRAIN: BACKGROUND CASES AND 
DOCTRINES 
This Part briefly traces the development of the disparate impact 
theory and its codification.  Also, this Part discusses the level of 
scrutiny applied to racial classifications under the Equal Protection 
Clause and concludes that strict scrutiny should be applied to disparate 
impact because disparate impact relies on racial classifications. 
A.  Disparate Impact 
1.  Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Congress enacted section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 to provide protections against employment discrimination and 
other illegalities by providing as follows: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.36 
The difference between the two provisions of § 703(a) is intent.  
Under § 703(a)(1), commonly known as the disparate treatment 
provision, courts require a showing of conscious intent to discriminate 
or a discriminatory motive for employer liability.37  In contrast, § 
703(a)(2), the disparate impact provision, as interpreted by Griggs, does 
not require intent.38  Disparate impact is result-oriented, focusing on 
consequences instead of motive.39  The Court recently clarified in Lewis 
 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008) (emphases added). 
37. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (“In such ‘disparate 
treatment’ cases, which involve ‘the most easily understood type of discrimination,’ . . . the 
plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive.” (citing 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977))). 
38. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
39. See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural 
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 136 (2003) (“Defining 
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that “[u]nless and until the defendant [employer] pleads and proves a 
business-necessity defense, the plaintiff wins simply by showing the 
stated elements” of disparate impact.40  Under the disparate impact 
provision, employers may be liable when they use neutral criteria that 
cause a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected group and cannot 
justify the criteria based on business necessity and job relatedness.41  
Even with a showing of necessity and job relatedness, employers whose 
practices have a disproportionate adverse effect may be liable if they 
refuse to use equally effective alternatives that have a less adverse 
effect.42 
2.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
The landmark case Griggs v. Duke Power Co.43 was only the 
Supreme Court’s second interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964,44 which led to the Court’s adoption of the disparate impact 
theory.45  The issue in Griggs was whether Title VII permitted an 
employer to condition employment or job transfers on a high school 
diploma or passing a standardized general intelligence test.46  Before 
Title VII became effective, Duke Power Company had discriminated on 
 
discrimination in terms of consequences rather than purpose or motive, disparate impact theory 
interprets Title VII to require that members of protected groups not be unnecessarily harmed in 
employment because of group differences.”). 
40. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010). 
41. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
42. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009).  “The constitutional standard for 
adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is [not] identical to the standards applicable 
under Title VII.”  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).  In Washington v. Davis, the 
Court held that disproportionate impact alone is not sufficient to prove invidious racial 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 242.  In contrast, the disparate impact 
provision in Title VII only requires proof of a disproportionate effect—not intent.  See Griggs, 
401 U.S. at 432. 
43. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  For excellent summaries of the development of disparate impact, 
see Lorin J. Lapidus, Diversity’s Divergence: A Post-Grutter Examination of Racial Preferences 
In Public Employment, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 199, 211–27 (2006); Michael Selmi, Was the 
Disparate Impact Theory A Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 701–34 (2006); Elaine W. Shoben, 
Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still Good For? What 
Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 600–07 (2004); Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside 
Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1513–24 (2004); 
Ronald Turner, Grutter, The Diversity Justification, And Workplace Affirmative Action, 43 
BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 222–36 (2004–2005). 
44. Selmi, supra note 43, at 708. 
45. The disparate impact theory was ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in Griggs, but 
it did not originate with the Court.  See id. (“[T]wo important cases, two influential law review 
articles, and a strategic decision by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) all 
contributed to the creation of the [disparate impact] theory . . . .”). 
46. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26. 
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the basis of race in its hiring and transfer policies.47  African-Americans 
were employed only in the one department that offered the lowest 
paying jobs.48  After Title VII’s passage, the company changed its 
policies to include the high school diploma and aptitude test 
requirements.49 
The new requirements imposed by the company adversely affected 
African-Americans.50  The district court, however, found no intentional 
discrimination by the employer because the high school diploma and 
aptitude tests were applied equally to Caucasians and African-
Americans.51 
The Supreme Court unanimously invalidated the policies, holding 
that the Civil Rights Act prohibited “not only overt discrimination but 
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”52  
The Court explained that employers acting with good intent or absent 
discriminatory intent cannot “redeem” employment practices that cause 
a disparate impact53 and must justify their policies with a business 
necessity related to job performance.54  Because there was evidence that 
workers who did not have a high school education or who did not take 
the intelligence test performed their jobs satisfactorily, the Court 
concluded that the company failed to show a business necessity for the 
requirements.55  As a result of Griggs, the Court’s interpretation of Title 
VII expanded the protection afforded by the statute to include both 
disparate treatment and disparate impact. 
 
47. Id. at 426–27. 
48. Id. at 427. 
49. Id. at 427–28. 
50. Id. at 429.  The Court noted that in 1960, 34% of white males had completed high school 
as compared with 12% of African-American males in the state, and that the EEOC found 58% of 
whites passed the generalized intelligence tests as compared with 6% of African-Americans.  Id. 
at 431 n.6. 
51. Id. at 429.  The Court recognized the employer’s efforts to assist employees by financing 
two-thirds of the cost for high school training.  Id. at 432.  These efforts likely militated against a 
finding of intent by the lower court.  See Selmi, supra note 43, at 719 (“The company’s 
explanation for the test, and its willingness to pay some of the education costs for those who 
sought to finish high school, transformed the case, at least in the Supreme Court’s eyes, from one 
of intentional discrimination to something different.”). 
52. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
53. Id. at 432. 
54. Id. at 431. 
55. Id. at 431–32. 
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3.  Post-Griggs Cases: From Albemarle to Wards Cove 
Four years after Griggs, the Court clarified in Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody56 the requirement of job relatedness announced earlier in 
Griggs.  In this case, the company imposed similar requirements as in 
Griggs.57  The company argued that the high school education and 
intelligence test requirements were necessary for safety and efficiency58 
because of the increasing sophistication of the plant’s operations.59  The 
company, however, failed to validate the tests.60  The Court reaffirmed, 
“[D]iscriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown, by 
professionally acceptable methods, to be predictive of or significantly 
correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or 
are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being 
evaluated.”61  The Court also expanded the disparate impact theory by 
allowing plaintiffs to rebut an employer’s business necessity and job 
relatedness justification by showing that reasonable, less discriminatory 
alternatives existed.62 
In 1982, the Supreme Court additionally fortified the disparate impact 
theory in Connecticut v. Teal63 by rejecting an employer’s bottom-line 
defense.  In its defense, the employer contended that although the test at 
issue caused a disparate impact upon minorities, the result of the entire 
hiring process rendered no disparate impact because minorities were 
proportionately hired and promoted.64  The Court emphasized, “It is 
clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide 
an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without 
regard to whether members of the applicant’s race are already 
proportionally represented in the work force.”65 
Several years later, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, the Court 
extended disparate impact liability to include the use of subjective or 
discretionary employment practices.66  The following year, however, 
 
56. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
57. Id. at 410–11. 
58. Id. at 411. 
59. Id. at 428. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 431 (quoting U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Uniform Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (2008)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
62. Id. at 425. 
63. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
64. Id. at 452. 
65. Id. at 454–55. 
66. 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988). 
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the Court began to curtail its expansion of disparate impact.  In Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,67 the Court relaxed the standard for 
showing business necessity68 and shifted the burden of persuasion to the 
plaintiff.69 
4.  Codification of Disparate Impact 
Congress regarded the Court’s decision in Wards Cove, as well as the 
others that followed,70 as a diminution71 of employment rights protected 
in Title VII72 and accordingly responded by passing the Civil Rights 
 
67. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
68. Id. at 659.  The Court modified the business necessity requirement to a showing of 
“whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of 
the employer” and rejected a requirement that the employer show that the practice is “essential” 
or “indispensable.”  Id. 
69. The employer has the burden of producing evidence of a business necessity, but plaintiff 
bears the burden of persuasion to “prove that it was ‘because of such individual’s race, color,’ 
etc., that [the plaintiff] was denied employment opportunity.”  Id. at 659–60 (quoting 42 U.S.C § 
2000e-2(a)). 
70. Congress also sought to redress the damage brought on by Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071; Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; and 
Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.  For a historical review of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, see David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 8 LAB. LAW. 849, 
849–55 (1992); Roger Clegg, Introduction: A Brief History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. 
L. REV. 1459, 1463 (1994); Douglas W. Kmiec, The 1991 Civil Rights Act: A Constitutional, 
Statutory, and Philosophical Enigma, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 913 (1993); Claude Platton, 
Note, Title VII Disparate Impact Suits Against State Governments After Hibbs and Lane, 55 
DUKE L.J. 641, 665–69 (2005). 
71. But see Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A “Quota Bill,” a Codification 
of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 287, 
293 (1993) (“The most important aspect of Griggs . . . was not challenged by a single Justice in 
Wards Cove. At most, the Wards Cove opinion made only marginal adjustments to the disparate-
impact doctrine, although .  .  . it arguably did not change the doctrine at all.”). 
72. Congress stated in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 the following purposes for the Act: 
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful 
harassment in the workplace; 
(2) to codify the concepts of “business necessity” and “job related” enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other 
Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989); 
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication 
of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
2000e et seq.); and 
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of 
relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection for victims of 
discrimination. 
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Act in 1991.73  In § 703(k) of Title VII, Congress codified disparate 
impact, which previously had been merely an interpretation of § 
703(a)(2) applied by the courts.  The amended statute provides: 
(1)(A)  An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is 
established under this subchapter only if— 
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent 
fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity; or 
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in 
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice 
and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment 
practice.74 
B.  Racial Classification Under Equal Protection and Strict Scrutiny 
Whether disparate impact can prevail under an Equal Protection 
challenge depends on the level of scrutiny applied, which in turn 
depends on whether disparate impact involves racial classifications.  
This section discusses the circumstances under which strict scrutiny is 
applied and considers whether disparate impact implicates racial 
classifications and is, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny. 
1.  Racial Classification 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
against governmental racial classification.75  City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson76 and Adarand v. Peña77 established that all racial 
classifications, even with a benign purpose, are subject to strict 
scrutiny78—“that is, such classifications are constitutional only if they 
 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071. 
73. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694 (stating 
the intent of Congress was to “respond to recent Supreme Court decisions by restoring the civil 
rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions . . . [and] to strengthen 
existing protections and remedies available under federal civil rights laws to provide more 
effective deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of discrimination”). 
74. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A) (2008)). 
75. The Supreme Court has “consistently repudiated ‘[distinctions] between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose intuitions are founded upon the 
doctrine of equality.’”  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943))). 
76. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
77. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
78. Initially, there were several factors for determining if a racial classification is 
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are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental 
interests . . . .”79  Classifications based on race, alienage, or national 
origin are subject to strict scrutiny because “these factors are so seldom 
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws 
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and 
antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or 
deserving as others.”80  Strict scrutiny functions to “‘smoke out’ 
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing 
a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”81 
It is unclear if the disparate impact provision is an express racial 
classification,82 but the Court’s analysis in Ricci may shed light on how 
the Court might answer this question.  Because the city decided not to 
certify the examination scores as a result of “the statistical disparity 
based on race,”83 the Court characterized the city’s action as “express, 
race-based decisionmaking.”84  The Court explained, “[T]he City 
rejected the test results because ‘too many whites and not enough 
minorities would be promoted were the lists to be certified.’”85  The 
City’s interest in avoiding disparate impact liability led it to make 
 
constitutional: whether it is benign as opposed to invidious and whether it is state or federal 
action, which bears on whether a Fifth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment violation is being 
asserted.  Croson held that “the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not 
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification” and adopted 
strict scrutiny as the unified standard for benign and invidious racial classifications.  488 U.S. at 
493 (emphasis added).  The Court explained the necessity of subjecting benign classifications to 
strict scrutiny: “[T]here is simply no way of determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or 
‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial 
inferiority or simple racial politics.”  Id.  Adarand reaffirmed Croson’s adoption of strict scrutiny 
“despite the surface appeal of holding ‘benign’ racial classifications to a lower standard.”  515 
U.S. at 226.  The Court’s decision in Adarand clarified that it makes no difference whether the 
actor is the federal, state, or local government or whether a Fifth Amendment Due Process or the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim is being asserted: “[A]ll racial 
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed 
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny . . . .”  Id. at 227. 
 For a discussion of the development of strict scrutiny, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial 
Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273–85 (2007); K.G. Jan Pillai, Phantom of the Strict 
Scrutiny, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 397, 397–419 (1997); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict 
in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 
798–801 (2006). 
79. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
80. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
81. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. 
82. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2696–704 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that no racial classification exists). 
83. Id. at 2674 (majority opinion). 
84. Id. at 2673. 
85. Id. (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006)). 
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decisions based on race.  Similarly, for other employers, it would be 
difficult to divorce considerations of race from their employment 
decisions that are centered on avoiding disparate impact liability. 
Additionally, if the City’s race-conscious action taken to avoid 
disparate impact liability can be characterized as racial classification, 
then a fortiori Title VII’s imposition of disparate impact liability on the 
basis of race can be similarly characterized.  It would be impossible to 
assess compliance with the disparate impact provision without grouping 
employees or candidates into racial categories.  Thus, although Title VII 
does not explicitly classify people into different racial categories, the 
application of the disparate impact provision, as seen in Ricci, may be 
the functional equivalent. 
There may be disagreement as to whether Title VII’s disparate impact 
provision should be subject to strict scrutiny,86 but the purpose of this 
Article is to test the provision under the most rigorous conditions—that 
being strict scrutiny—to determine if it can withstand an Equal 
Protection Clause challenge.87  Therefore, this Article will proceed on 
the presumption that the disparate impact provision is a racial 
classification that triggers strict scrutiny. 
2.  Strict Scrutiny 
Once strict scrutiny is invoked, the application of strict scrutiny 
requires the government to show that its action is narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling purpose.88  The point of the compelling purpose 
 
86. A normative discussion of whether neutral practices that are race conscious should be 
subject to strict scrutiny is a subject for an article in itself. 
87. I recognize that the ability of Title VII’s disparate impact provision to withstand an Equal 
Protection Clause challenge might depend on the level of scrutiny applied. 
88. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (explaining that racial 
classifications imposed by a governmental actor “are constitutional only if they are narrowly 
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests”).  The application of strict 
scrutiny has been described as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”  Professor Gerald Gunther first 
coined this now oft-quoted phrase.  Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Forward: 
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
 Whether a case survives strict scrutiny depends on the context.  In an empirical study of cases 
in 1990–2003 subjected to strict scrutiny, Professor Adam Winkler found that 27% of the suspect 
classification cases survived.  Winkler, supra note 78, at 814–15.  In comparison, the study 
reported the survival rate of other cases reviewed under strict scrutiny: 
religious liberty 59% 
freedom of association  33% 
fundamental rights  24% 
freedom of speech  22% 
Id. at 815; see Stephen E. Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rehnquist Court, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
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requirement is to evaluate the importance of the government’s objective 
and ensure that the particular goal is worthy of pursuit when compared 
to the harm that may ensue.89 
The narrow tailoring component serves to verify that the purported 
purpose is indeed the actual purpose.  It aids in “smoking out” any 
illegitimate purpose90 and assures, by evaluating other alternatives, that 
the challenged action is necessary to accomplish the government’s 
goal.91 
II.  PHILOSOPHICAL OR THEORETICAL CONFLICT? 
Before this Article turns to the main inquiry of whether there is a 
doctrinal conflict between the disparate impact provision and Equal 
Protection Clause, another relevant query worth exploring is whether 
there is a theoretical or philosophical conflict between the two.  In terms 
of whom the two doctrines are intended to protect, there is symmetry 
between the disparate impact provision and the Equal Protection Clause.  
The Equal Protection Clause protects “persons, not groups,”92 as 
expressed in the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment.93 
The disparate impact provision similarly protects persons rather than 
groups.  This conclusion is supported by the Court’s reasoning in 
Connecticut v. Teal because of its rejection of the bottom-line defense.94  
In Teal, the test the employer used as a basis for promotion had a 
disparate impact on African-Americans,95 which the employer did not 
dispute.96  The employer, however, argued that there was no disparate 
impact overall—on the bottom-line—because the test did not actually 
“deprive disproportionate numbers of blacks of promotions.”97  
 
350, 366–67 (2002) (critiquing the Rehnquist Court’s approach to equal protection). 
89. See Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to 
Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2000) (explaining that the 
“compelling governmental interest” requirement allows a reviewing court to evaluate the 
importance of the government’s goal in using a classification, and also permits the court to weigh 
the government’s goal with potential “harm wrought by use of the classification”). 
90. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
91. Rubin, supra note 89, at 14. 
92. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (recognizing “the basic principle that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments protect persons, not groups”). 
93. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
94. 457 U.S. 440, 452 (1982). 
95. Id. at 442–43.  The passing rate for African-Americans was 68% of the passing rate for 
Caucasians.  Id. at 443.  This resulted in disparate impact as defined by the four-fifths rule of the 
Uniform Guidelines implemented by the EEOC.  Id. at 444. 
96. Id. at 444. 
97. Id. at 452. 
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Although a smaller percentage of African-Americans passed the test 
than Caucasians, after the employer applied an affirmative action 
program, a greater percentage of African-Americans than Caucasians 
were promoted.98  The bottom-line defense used in Teal was premised 
on the argument that, overall, no group suffered as a consequence of the 
test.99  The Court, however, rejected this defense because Title VII 
affords equal opportunity to “each applicant.”100  Relying on the 
language in § 703(a)(2), the Court concluded that the disparate impact 
theory “prohibits practices that would deprive or tend to deprive ‘any 
individual of employment opportunities’”101 and “the principle focus . . 
. is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection 
of the minority group as a whole.”102  Thus, at least theoretically, the 
disparate impact provision and Equal Protection Clause are consistent in 
their focus on protecting individuals. 
III.  BATTLEFIELD STRATEGIES FOR FINDING A COMPELLING INTEREST 
The question left lingering in Ricci is whether Title VII’s disparate 
impact provision violates the Equal Protection Clause by causing 
employers to take race into account in deciding which employment 
policies to adopt.103  Consequently, if disparate impact is to survive the 
war, it must first shield itself with a compelling interest. 
The purpose of this Part is to explore the possible compelling 
interests that may justify the use of racial classifications that underlie 
disparate impact.  This Part will examine six grounds that may serve as 
compelling justifications: (1) remedying past discrimination; (2) 
smoking out intentional or unconscious discrimination; (3) obtaining the 
benefits attributable to diversity; (4) providing role models; (5) meeting 
operational needs; and (6) providing equal employment opportunities by 
removing barriers.  An exploration of each rationale includes an 
analysis of whether case law or empirical evidence can support the 
rationale as a compelling interest.  Finally, this Part provides a critique 
for each justification. 
 
98. Id. at 444. 
99. Id. at 452. 
100. Id. at 454–55. 
101. Id. at 453. 
102. Id. at 453–54 (emphases added). 
103. State action exists because Congress is requiring employers to act in a certain way.  See 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–16 (1989) (holding that regulations that 
authorized, but not required, employers to administer blood and urine tests constituted state action 
because the government encouraged this practice). 
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A.  Remedying Past Discrimination Versus Societal Discrimination 
Governmental bodies have used racial classifications to address 
generalized societal discrimination and past discrimination by the 
governmental actor.  This section discusses the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of remedying societal discrimination and past discrimination 
as compelling interests under Equal Protection and examines whether 
the disparate impact provision can be appropriately used as a remedial 
measure to survive strict scrutiny.  This section concludes that it is 
difficult to justify disparate impact’s use of racial classification on a 
remedial need because a showing of past discrimination by a state actor 
is necessary. 
1.  Societal Discrimination 
The Court has unequivocally disallowed remedying past societal 
discrimination to be a sufficient compelling governmental interest104 
because “societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a 
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy.”105  If the interest of the 
disparate impact provision is to remedy past social wrongs, then it 
would fail the compelling interest component of the strict scrutiny test.  
The Court’s statement in Teal could lead one to believe that Griggs, at 
least in part, involved an interest in remedying past societal 
discrimination.  In Teal, the Court stated, “Griggs was rightly concerned 
that childhood deficiencies in the education and background of minority 
citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control, not be allowed to 
work a cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens for the 
remainder of their lives.”106  The Court’s statement in Teal suggests that 
Griggs was intended to be a remedy for the past societal discrimination 
that resulted in inadequate education and limited employment 
opportunities for African-Americans. 
Griggs, however, rejected the interpretation of Title VII as a remedial 
measure for past social harms.  The Court clarified: 
[Title VII] does not command that any person be hired simply because 
he was formerly the subject of discrimination . . . . What is required by 
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary 
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to 
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible 
classification.107 
 
104. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 269 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
105. Id. at 276. 
106. Teal, 457 U.S. at 447. 
107. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971). 
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This clarification in Griggs rebuts the suspicion that the disparate 
impact provision’s use of racial classification was intended to promote 
the impermissible purpose of rectifying past societal discrimination. 
2.  Remedial Purpose Recognized as Compelling 
While remedying societal discrimination is not sufficiently 
compelling, the Court has recognized a remedial need to compensate for 
the government’s own past discrimination as a compelling purpose.  
The Court has set forth in Regents of University of California v. 
Bakke108 that to justify using racial classification as a remedy for past 
discrimination, a government actor must show that it engaged in 
statutory or constitutional violations.109  A mere recitation of remedial 
need is not enough. 
a.  Insufficient Evidence of Remedial Need 
In Bakke and its progeny, the Court invalidated purported remedial 
policies because the government failed to substantiate its race-based 
program with evidence showing a remedial need.  In Bakke, the 
controversy centered on a medical school’s admission procedure that 
reserved sixteen out of one hundred seats in its entering class for 
minorities.110  The Court invalidated the admissions policy because the 
“history of discrimination in society at large”111 could not justify the 
medical school’s use of a racial quota in its admissions process when 
there lacked “judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of 
constitutional or statutory violations.”112  As the Court explained, “Only 
then does the government have a compelling interest in favoring one 
race over another.”113 
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,114 the Court reaffirmed 
Bakke’s “distinction between ‘societal discrimination,’ which is an 
inadequate basis for race-conscious classifications, and the type of 
identified discrimination that can support and define the scope of race-
based relief.”115  The issue in Wygant involved a school board’s layoff 
procedure that required the retention of the most senior teachers unless 
the percentage of minority teachers laid off exceeded the percentage of 
 
108. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
109. Id. at 301–02, 309. 
110. Id. at 279. 
111. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 (1989). 
112. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
113. Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307–09). 
114. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
115. Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (discussing Wygant, generally). 
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minority teachers retained.116  The policy, which was instituted because 
of racial tension in the community and schools,117 resulted in the 
retention of minority teachers with less seniority than the nonminority 
teachers who were laid off.118 
The school board defended its policy as providing minority role 
models for minority students in an effort to ameliorate the effects of 
societal discrimination.119  The Court rejected this justification, 
declaring that “[t]his Court has never held that societal discrimination 
alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification.  Rather, the Court has 
insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the 
governmental unit involved before allowing use of racial classifications 
in order to remedy such discrimination.”120  The school board did not 
have “a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action 
was necessary”121 because the “statistical disparity between students 
and teachers had no probative value in demonstrating the kind of prior 
discrimination in hiring or promotion that would justify race-based 
relief.”122 
Similarly, in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the government lacked a 
strong basis in evidence for its remedial measures.123  In Croson, the 
city council adopted a plan that required prime contractors that receive 
city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the contract 
award to Minority Business Enterprises.124  The city council passed the 
plan for a remedial “purpose of promoting wider participation by 
minority business enterprises in the construction of public projects.”125  
However, there was no evidence of discrimination by the city in 
awarding contracts or by the prime contractors against minority-owned 
subcontractors.126  The Court reiterated the requirement that there be 
“some showing of a prior discrimination by a governmental unit 
involved”127 and explained that “if the city could show that it had 
 
116. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 269–70. 
117. Id. at 270. 
118. Id. at 272.  The nonminority teachers affected by the policy sued the school board, 
alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII, among other claims.  Id. 
119. Id. at 274. 
120. Id. at 269. 
121. Id. at 277. 
122. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989) (discussing the failure of 
the role model theory that was presented in Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276, 294). 
123. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500. 
124. Id. at 477. 
125. Id. at 478. 
126. Id. at 480, 485. 
127. Id. at 492.  Subsequent cases adhered strictly to Croson’s and Wygant’s requirement that 
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essentially become a ‘passive participant’ in a system of racial 
exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry, . . . 
the city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system.”128 
Finally, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1,129 there was no compelling interest because the remedial 
need had ceased.  In this case, the Court considered whether public 
school districts that had not previously engaged in segregation may 
assign students to schools based on racial classifications.130  The Seattle 
School District allowed its students to submit a list of preferences in 
selecting a high school to attend.  In cases where too many students 
chose a particular school, the school district used “tie breakers” to 
decide which students would attend the school.131  Students who had 
siblings attending the chosen school received first priority in 
enrollment.132  The second-level tiebreaker involved consideration of 
the “racial composition of the particular school and the race of the 
individual student.”133  If the school’s racial composition was not within 
ten percentage points of the district’s white to non-white racial 
distribution, then the district assigned students on the basis of how they 
would contribute to the school’s racial balance.134 
The school district was unable to justify its racial classification on 
remedial grounds because although the public schools in one particular 
county had previously segregated students based on race, the schools 
eventually “achieved unitary status” and were no longer subject to 
desegregation decrees.135  The achievement of unitary status rebutted 
any necessity of using racial classifications to remedy constitutional or 
statutory violations.136 
 
the government must show past discrimination to substantiate remedial racial classifications.  See 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2675 (2009) (“The Court has held that certain government 
actions to remedy past racial discrimination—actions that are themselves based on race—are 
constitutional only where there is a ‘strong basis in evidence’ that the remedial actions were 
necessary.” (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 500)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 
220 (1995) (“‘[I]t must have sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has been prior 
discrimination.’” (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277)). 
128. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492. 
129. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
130. Id. at 711. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 711–12. 
133. Id. at 712. 
134. Id. The final tiebreaker was the distance between the student’s residence and the 
preferred school.  Id. 
135. Id. at 720–21. 
136. Id. at 721. 
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b.  Sufficient Evidence of Remedial Need 
In two cases, however, the Court found a sufficient need to remedy 
past discrimination.  In Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ 
International Association v. EEOC,137 the Court upheld a race-
conscious quota that provided remedial relief for prior union 
discrimination against African-Americans.  In this case, the union had 
previously excluded African-Americans from union membership and 
participation in its apprenticeship program.138  Consequently, it was 
sued for its discriminatory activities.  To resolve the suit, the district 
court established a 29% non-white membership goal139 because of the 
union’s “long and persistent pattern of discrimination” that had 
“consistently and egregiously violated Title VII.”140  During a span of 
seven years, the union delayed implementing the district court’s 
order141 and was twice cited for contempt by the court.142  At the last 
hearing, the district court modified the membership goal and ordered the 
union to establish a fund “to be used for the purpose of remedying 
discrimination.”143  The Supreme Court upheld the membership goal 
and fund against an Equal Protection challenge144 because both 
measures were necessary to remedy the union’s persistent 
discrimination and Title VII violations.145 
 
137. 478 U.S. 421 (1986). 
138. Id. at 427. 
139. Id. at 432.  This goal was later upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
140. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order.  Id. at 433. 
141. The district court found that the union had resisted implementing the court’s prior order 
in the following ways: 
(1) adopted a policy of underutilizing the apprenticeship program in order to limit 
nonwhite membership and employment opportunities; (2) refused to conduct the 
general publicity campaign required by the O & J and RAAPO to inform nonwhites of 
membership opportunities; (3) added a job protection provision to the union’s 
collective-bargaining agreement that favored older workers and discriminated against 
nonwhites (old workers provision); (4) issued unauthorized work permits to white 
workers from sister locals; and (5) failed to maintain and submit records and reports 
required by RAAPO, the O & J, and the administrator, thus making it difficult to 
monitor [the union’s] compliance with the court’s order. 
Id. at 434–35. 
142. The district court entered an order and judgment after the trial in 1975.  Id. at 431.  The 
two contempt proceedings took place in 1982 and 1983.  Id. at 434–35. 
143. Id. at 436. 
144. Id. at 440.  The plaintiffs pursued a claim under the equal protection component of the 
Due Process Clause, which for all intents and purposes, is analytically equivalent to the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  For an explanation of the congruence between 
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, see also 
supra text accompanying note 78. 
145. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 436. 
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Also, in United States v. Paradise,146 the Court upheld a quota for the 
promotion of African-Americans that was intended to remedy the 
systematic exclusion of African-Americans as state troopers.147  In 
1972, the district court found that the Alabama Department of Public 
Safety had discriminated against African-Americans.148  As a result, the 
district court issued an order that the department hire one African-
American trooper for each Caucasian trooper until the percentage of 
African-American troopers within the state reached 25%.149  Eleven 
years later, there was still not one African-American trooper in the 
upper ranks.150  Consequently, the district court imposed a 50% 
promotional quota in the upper ranks.151  In reviewing this quota, the 
Supreme Court upheld the quota because the district court substantiated 
a compelling purpose of remedying the department’s past 
discrimination in the hiring and promotion of African-Americans 
among the state trooper force.152  The relief crafted by the district court 
was justified by “the department’s failure after almost twelve years to 
eradicate the continuing effects of its own discrimination.”153 
The above cases, whether the Court found a compelling need or not, 
illustrate the Court’s insistence on a showing of past discrimination by 
the government actor as a predicate to establishing a racial 
classification, even a benign one. 
3.  Analysis of Disparate Impact Serving a Remedial Purpose 
An argument could be made that the disparate impact provision’s use 
of racial classification serves a compelling interest because it was 
intended to remedy past discrimination.  The disparate impact theory 
was conceived to address seniority systems and lines154 used to 
 
146. 480 U.S. 149 (1986). 
147. Id. at 153. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 154–55. 
150. Id. at 162–63.  There were only four black corporals out of sixty-six, but no blacks 
among the ranks of sergeants, captains, or majors.  Id. at 163. 
151. Id. at 163. 
152. Id. at 170. 
153. Id. at 169. 
154. Congress expressed concern over the misuse of such employment practices: 
Employment discrimination, as we know today, is a far more complex and pervasive 
phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject generally describe the problem in terms 
of “systems” and “effects” rather than simply intentional wrongs. The literature on the 
subject is replete with discussions of the mechanics of seniority and lines of 
progression, perpetuation of the present effects of earlier discriminatory practices 
through various institutional devices, and testing and validation requirements. 
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 694 (1991). 
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perpetuate past intentional discrimination.155  The allusion to prior 
discriminatory practices in several of the Court’s opinions could support 
an inference that disparate impact was intended to provide remedial 
relief for these pervasive and systemic discriminatory schemes. 
In Griggs, the Court stated, 
The objective . . . of Title VII is . . . to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to 
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. 
Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and 
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 
“freeze” the status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices.156 
Similarly, the Court in Sheet Metal Workers opined, 
Congress enacted Title VII based on its determination that racial 
minorities were subject to pervasive and systematic discrimination in 
employment. It was clear to Congress that the crux of the problem was 
to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which 
have been traditionally closed to them, . . . and it was this problem that 
Title VII’s prohibition against racial discrimination was primarily 
addressed.157 
Notwithstanding these passages showing a remedial intent behind 
disparate impact, “the mere recitation of ‘benign’ or legitimate purpose 
for a racial classification is entitled to little or no weight.”158  The 
lessons of Bakke, Wygant, and Croson prove that there must be an 
administrative, legislative, or judicial finding that employers have 
violated the Constitution or a statute before disparate impact can be 
implemented as a remedial measure.  Additionally, Parents Involved is 
instructive for the lesson that once discrimination has been rectified, a 
remedial purpose cannot sustain a racial classification. 
Defending disparate impact on a remedial need rationale is difficult 
because disparate impact seems to suffer the same defects as the 
 
155. See Selmi, supra note 43, at 705 (“[T]he disparate impact theory arose initially to deal 
with specific practices, seniority systems and written tests, that were perpetuating past intentional 
discrimination.”). 
 Section 703(h) of Title VII protects “bona fide” seniority systems if they “are not the result of 
an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006); see also SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 192 (2004) (stating that the federal 
involvement in fighting discrimination in employment began in response to resistance to 
integration and the emergence of a national civil rights movement). 
156. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (emphasis added). 
157. 478 U.S. at 448 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)). 
158. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989). 
NGOV.CORRECTED.PAGES_23.83.DOC 12/3/2010  11:47:58 AM 
2010] Battling for a Compelling Interest 27 
programs in Bakke, Wygant, and Croson.  According to the Court’s 
interpretation in Griggs and Sheet Metal Workers, an argument can be 
made that Congress intended for disparate impact to remedy the 
discriminatory practices that excluded African-Americans from 
employment.  Such an interest, however, would be as amorphous as the 
interest in setting a quota in Croson to remedy the exclusion of African-
Americans from unions and training programs.159  As the Court stated 
in Croson, 
While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and 
public discrimination in this country has contributed to the lack of 
opportunities for black entrepreneurs, this observation, standing alone, 
cannot justify a rigid racial quota . . . . Like the claim that 
discrimination in primary and secondary schooling justifies a rigid 
racial preference in medical school admissions, an amorphous claim 
that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot 
justify the use of an unyielding quota.160 
In Wygant, the Court concluded that the “statistical disparity between 
students and teachers had no probative value in demonstrating the kind 
of prior discrimination in hiring or promotion that would justify race-
based relief.”161  Similarly, the Croson court found that the 30% set-
aside “[could] not in any realistic sense be tied to any injury suffered by 
anyone.”162  Likewise, in the context of disparate impact, it could be 
argued that the disparity manifested by the application of the four-fifths 
 
159. The city contended that past exclusion of African-Americans “has prevented them from 
following the traditional path from laborer to entrepreneur.”  Id. at 498 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
160. Id. at 499.  The Court was not persuaded by a “highly conclusionary statement of a 
proponent of the Plan that there was racial discrimination in the construction industry ‘in this 
area, the State, and around the nation’” and by “the city manager [who] had related his view that 
racial discrimination still plagued the construction industry in his home city of Pittsburgh.”  Id. at 
500.  These statements, the Court explained, were 
of little probative value in establishing identified discrimination in the Richmond 
construction industry. The factfinding process of legislative bodies is generally entitled 
to a presumption of regularity and deferential review by the judiciary. But when a 
legislative body chooses to employ a suspect classification, it cannot rest upon a 
generalized assertion as to the classification’s relevance to its goals. 
Id. 
161. Id. at 497 (discussing Wygant). 
162. Id. at 499.  At the time when the Court decided Croson, there were 234 Minority 
Business Enterprise programs.  Jeffrey M. Hanson, Note, Hanging By Yarns?: Deficiencies in 
Anecdotal Evidence Threaten the Survival of Race-Based Preference Programs for Public 
Contracting, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1433, 1444 (2003).  To salvage some of these programs after 
Croson, state and local governments spent fifty-five million dollars to commission more than 140 
disparity studies to substantiate a compelling remedial interest in using racial set-aside programs.  
Id. 
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rule163 reflects merely a current state of racial imbalance resulting from 
the employer’s selection process.  A showing that racial disparity exists 
in success rates among candidates or applicants lacks probative value in 
showing that a particular employer had engaged in prior discrimination.  
The disparate impact provision cannot be tied to a remedial need 
because it applies to all employers and may subject a new employer to 
liability, even when the employer lacks any business history. 
In contrast, the remedial plans in Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers 
were upheld because the Court found that the government actor itself 
engaged in prior discrimination and court-ordered remedial programs 
were directed at providing relief from that particular government actor’s 
past discriminatory activities.  An extension of Paradise and Sheet 
Metal Workers to disparate impact would require a demonstration that a 
particular employer had discriminated before disparate impact can be 
applied as a remedial measure against that employer.  This would limit 
the application of disparate impact to a case-by-case basis, rather than 
its current broad utilization. 
The Court has waived the requirement for demonstrating prior 
constitutional or statutory violations as a prerequisite for remedial racial 
classifications, but that case is inapposite.  In United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber,164 a union and employer voluntarily entered into an 
agreement requiring a quota for minority employees to be admitted into 
a training program.165  The Court approved of this program, holding 
that Title VII did not prohibit voluntary compliance.166  Weber is 
inapposite because the Court reviewed the program at issue under Title 
VII, not the Equal Protection Clause.  Moreover, Weber involved a 
quota voluntarily instituted by private parties, not a government actor. 
Some statements made by the Court in dicta, however, complicate the 
discussion as to whether there is a remedial need for disparate impact.  
In passing, the Bakke Court discussed the disparate impact standard 
under Title VII: 
[T]he presumption in Griggs—that disparate impact without any 
showing of business justification established the existence of 
discrimination in violation of the statute—was based on legislative 
determinations, . . . that past discrimination had handicapped various 
 
163. For an explanation of the “four-fifths” rule, see supra text accompanying note 9. 
164. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
165. Id. at 197. 
166. Id. at 209. 
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minority groups to such an extent that disparate impact could be 
traced to identifiable instances of past discrimination.167 
The Court’s belief that disparate impact can be linked to “identifiable 
instances of past discrimination” may imply that the Court would find a 
strong basis in evidence that there is a remedial need for disparate 
impact.  But under subsequent Court decisions, those identifiable 
instances of discriminatory conduct must be traced to the actor seeking 
to implement the remedial program.  In the present case, because 
disparate impact is being federally enforced, it is the federal government 
that seeks to remedy past discrimination if a remedial argument is to be 
made.  If disparate impact can be defended as serving a remedial need, 
the federal government must show that the particular employer had 
previously discriminated.  Without particularized evidence of prior 
discriminatory misconduct by a specific employer, disparate impact 
would be susceptible to the criticism that it is attempting to remedy past 
societal discrimination. 
B.  “Smoking Out” Discrimination 
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence in Ricci,168 suggested that another 
possible defense of disparate impact against an Equal Protection claim 
might be to frame it as a tool for smoking out discrimination.  This 
section considers different forms of discrimination—intentional and 
unconscious discrimination—and how disparate impact might be used 
to uncover them.  Also, this section examines case law and empirical 
evidence to determine whether smoking out discrimination can be a 
compelling interest for disparate impact’s use of racial classifications to 
survive strict scrutiny. 
1.  Pretextual or Intentional Discrimination 
There are varying forms of discrimination.  Overt discrimination is 
the most obvious.  Pretextual discrimination is a subtle form of 
“intentional discrimination hidden behind a veneer of facially neutral 
practices.”169 
 
167. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 n.44 (1978) (plurality opinion) 
(emphasis added). 
168. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Primus, 
supra note 29, at 498–99, 520–21). 
169. Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate 
Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1541 (1996). 
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a.  The Need for Disparate Impact Because of Difficulty in Proving 
Intent 
Because pretextual discrimination is subtle, it makes detection of 
intentional discrimination difficult.  Consequently, one justification for 
allowing racial classifications in disparate impact is to compensate for 
the difficulty in identifying instances of intentional discrimination.  One 
can argue that Griggs is a prime example of pretextual discrimination 
and why disparate impact is needed to address the subtle forms of 
intentional discrimination, such as the use of neutral criteria.  The 
peculiar timing of events and the history of the employer’s actions raise 
concern about the employer’s intent behind the neutral criteria 
implemented in Griggs.  Prior to Title VII, the employer in Griggs had 
engaged in “overt racial discrimination”170 by restricting African-
American employees to work in the lowest paying department.171  But 
after the Act became effective, the employer replaced its intentionally 
discriminatory practice with the intelligence test and high school 
education requirements.172  Griggs seems to represent intentional use of 
neutral criteria to discriminate.173 
The district court, however, found in Griggs that there was no 
discriminatory intent behind the adoption of the hiring and promotion 
requirements.174  The district court’s finding is problematic to the 
argument that Griggs is a vindication of employees’ rights against 
intentionally discriminatory use of neutral criteria.  Griggs makes clear 
that disparate impact is not predicated on intent, and courts have 
subsequently interpreted Griggs “as an endorsement of ‘pure’ disparate 
impact theory” independent of intent.175 
 
170. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428 (1971). 
171. Id. at 427. 
172. Id. at 427–28.  Professor Rutherglen argues that “in Griggs, the fact that the employer 
substituted an intelligence test for outright segregation of its employees suggests that it was not 
genuinely seeking to measure intelligence . . . .”  George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact under 
Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1320–21 (1987). 
173. See Rutherglen, supra note 172, at 1331 (“In hindsight, Griggs appears to be a case of 
obvious pretextual discrimination . . . .”). 
174. The appellate court affirmed this finding: 
The Court of Appeals noted, however, that the District Court was correct in its 
conclusion that there was no showing of a racial purpose or invidious intent in the 
adoption of the high school diploma requirement or generalized intelligence test and 
that these standards had been applied fairly to whites and Negroes alike. 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429. 
175. Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact 
Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 342 (1983). 
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On the other hand, the district court’s inability to find intentional 
discrimination in Griggs can bolster the argument that disparate impact 
is needed because of the challenging task of proving an employer acted 
with discriminatory intent.  The fact that the seemingly pretextual 
discrimination in Griggs can escape a finding of intentional conduct 
underscores a possible justification for disparate impact.176 
b.  How Disparate Impact Can Smoke Out Intentional Discrimination 
Assuming that detecting intentional discrimination is a compelling 
purpose served by disparate impact, how might disparate impact smoke 
out such discrimination if it is hard to prove?  Disparate impact can 
smoke out intentional discrimination through the requirements that an 
employer show business necessity and job relatedness177 and use less 
adverse alternatives.  When a plaintiff proves a prima facie case through 
a showing of disparity, the employer must demonstrate that the practice 
is consistent with business necessity and is job related.178  Then, the 
plaintiff may rebut business necessity with evidence of the availability 
of alternatives that have less adverse impact.179  Business necessity and 
job relatedness help to detect discrimination because if an employment 
practice lacks a significant relationship to job performance, one could 
doubt the legitimacy of the practice.  The requirement that employers 
use less disparate alternatives contributes to the ability to smoke out 
intentional discrimination because availability of alternatives would 
refute the necessity of the practice.  As explained in Albemarle, the 
employer’s refusal to adopt an equally effective alternative that has a 
 
176. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to 
Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. 
REV. 277, 318 (2009) (citing Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of 
Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 290–91 (1997)) (stating the difficulty of proving 
intent). 
177. The conjunctive requirements of both job relatedness and business necessity have 
puzzled scholars and commentators.  See, e.g., Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims under 
the New Title VII, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1993).  The requirement for both job 
relatedness and business necessity seems to be duplicative.  As some have pointed out, it is 
difficult to imagine a selection criteria that is job related but not consistent with business 
necessity, or vice versa.  Id. 
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2008) (stating that upon the complaining party’s 
demonstration of a disparate impact, an employer must show “that the challenged practice is job 
related” and “consistent with business necessity”). 
179. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (explaining that an employment practice is unlawful based 
on disparate impact if the complaining party makes a demonstration of available alternative 
employment practices and also demonstrates the employer’s refusal to adopt such an alternative 
practice). 
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less disparate impact would be evidence of “pretextual” 
discrimination.180 
In order for the requirements of disparate impact to aid in the 
disparate impact provision’s ability to detect intentional discrimination, 
courts need to be clear as to the contours of business necessity and job 
relatedness.  Concurrent with codifying disparate impact, Congress 
provided an interpretative memorandum as a guide to enforcing the 
business necessity and job relatedness requirements.181  The 
memorandum instructed that business necessity and job relatedness 
would retain their definitions in Griggs and the cases before Wards 
Cove.182  The memorandum, however, provided little clarity because 
there was no settled understanding of business necessity and job 
relatedness in Griggs or subsequent cases. 
In Griggs alone, the Court articulated several definitions for business 
necessity: Employers must show that their practices are “related to job 
performance,”183 “have a manifest relationship to the employment in 
question,”184 “are a reasonable measure of job performance,”185 and 
“measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.”186  
Because the Supreme Court has not decided a disparate impact case 
under Title VII since the codification of disparate impact in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991,187 its indirection throughout the development of 
disparate impact has resulted in varying interpretations by the lower 
courts. 
 
180. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (“Such a showing would be 
evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a ‘pretext’ for discrimination.”). 
181. See 137 CONG. REC. 30630, 30662 (1991) (stating that the purpose of the legislation was 
to codify the definitions of “business necessity” and “job related” according to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., which determined that an employment practice 
that merely relates to a legitimate business purpose or serves the employer’s legitimate business 
goals will not exculpate the employer under the disparate impact provision (citing Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)). 
182. Id.  Congress was unable to agree on a statutory definition of “business necessity.”  See 
Hugh Davis Graham, The Act and the American Regulatory State, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 59 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000).  As a result, Congress accompanied the Act 
with contradictory memoranda from various congressional leaders.  Id.  Among the memoranda 
published in the Congressional Record was Senator John Danforth’s, which is cited as the 
exclusive source for the legislative history and intent concerning the burden of proof in disparate 
impact cases.  Id.  “This attempt within a statute to establish its own exclusive legislative history 
may [have been] unprecedented in the United States Code.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
183. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
184. Id. at 432. 
185. Id. at 436. 
186. Id. 
187. William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81, 100 
(2009). 
NGOV.CORRECTED.PAGES_23.83.DOC 12/3/2010  11:47:58 AM 
2010] Battling for a Compelling Interest 33 
The varying formulations of the disparate impact requirements 
include the following: 
(1) [R]equiring proof of either job-relatedness or necessity, or failing 
to distinguish between the two; (2) . . . requiring absolute necessity; 
and (3) . . . requiring reasonable necessity, including cases where the 
reasonableness of an employment criteria is determined on a sliding 
scale depending upon the nature of the employment and risks 
involved.188 
According to one commentator, the most rigorous standard requires that 
an employer substantiates a business necessity through showing 
“minimum qualifications that are necessary to perform the job in 
question successfully.”189  Another commentator regards the strict 
necessity standard to be the most arduous for employers.190  The most 
lax standard requires only that an employment practice “serves, in a 
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer.”191 
The selection of a particular formulation over another will bear on the 
ability of disparate impact to smoke out intentional discrimination.  
Thus, without an agreement as to a unified formulation of the disparate 
impact requirements, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of 
disparate impact as a detection device for intentional discrimination. 
c.  Problems with the “Smoking Out” Discrimination Rationale 
i.  Disparate Impact Is Not More Difficult to Prove than Intentional 
Discrimination 
One justification for disparate impact is that it is needed to smoke out 
intentional discrimination because such discrimination is difficult to 
prove.  But if this is not the case, then the compelling interest for the 
racial classification in disparate impact is greatly diminished.  Disparate 
impact is presumed to be easier to prove than intentional 
 
188. Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 45 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1029–30 (1993). 
189. Corbett, supra note 187, at 114–15 (citing Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 
478, 490 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
190. Spiropoulos, supra note 169, at 1543. 
191. Corbett, supra note 187, at 114 (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 
659 (1989)). 
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discrimination192 because a prima facie case of disparate impact rests 
merely on showing a disproportionately adverse effect.193 
One study, however, has shown that disparate impact claims, contrary 
to popular assumptions, are more difficult to prove than disparate 
treatment claims.194  One explanation for the difficulty in proving 
disparate impact claims is that the business necessity defense poses a 
significant obstacle for plaintiffs195 due to the deference that courts give 
to employers when evaluating business necessity.196  Additionally, 
disparate impact claims appear to have little success outside of the 
context of written tests.197  Finally, “many successful disparate impact 
claims also succeeded under a disparate treatment approach,198 thus 
rendering the disparate impact theory largely superfluous.”199  If 
disparate impact is not easier to prove, then this undermines the 
“smoking out theory”: intentional discrimination need not be smoked 
out if it is easier to prove than disparate impact.  Therefore, this could 
eliminate “smoking out” intentional discrimination as one possible 
compelling interest served by disparate impact. 
 
192. Selmi, supra note 43, at 734 (“[O]ne of the central attractions to disparate impact claims 
is the perception that they are easier to prove than claims of intentional discrimination . . . . In 
reality, however, the opposite is true: Disparate impact claims are more difficult to prove than 
standard intentional discrimination claims.”). 
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2008) (explaining that a complaining party can 
demonstrate a disproportionately adverse effect by showing that use of a particular employment 
practice causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and 
that the challenged practice is unrelated for the position in question or consistent with business 
necessity). 
194. Selmi, supra note 43, at 734. 
195. See id. at 749 (“The expectation that these [disparate impact] claims would be easier to 
establish than intentional discrimination claims rests entirely on the first part of the theory 
regarding the prima facie case of discrimination, but ignores the business necessity prong, which 
has always proved the greater hurdle.”). 
196. See Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 
IND. L.J. 773, 778 (2009) (“[B]usiness necessity [is] a standard which is rather deferential to 
employers.”). 
197. See Selmi, supra note 43, at 753–57 (arguing that written tests and their inherent 
shortfalls remain prevalent because there has been very little development or progress in the 
ability to predict academic or employment potential). 
198. See Rutherglen, supra note 172, at 1331 (suggesting that Griggs “could equally well 
have been the subject of a claim of disparate treatment”). 
199. Selmi, supra note 43, at 742. 
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ii.  Disparate Impact as an Alternative Method of Proving Disparate 
Treatment 
It is appealing to treat disparate impact as another method of proving 
intentional discrimination or disparate treatment.200  The problem with 
this theory, however, is that it “does not offer any real constraints . . . . 
After all, the courts could scarcely invoke disparate impact any time 
they suspected a trial court’s or jury’s findings of no intent to 
discriminate were incorrect.”201  Another limitation to treating disparate 
impact as an evidentiary tool to identify intentional discrimination is 
Justice Scalia’s criticism that “the disparate-impact provisions sweep 
too broadly to be fairly characterized in such a fashion—since they fail 
to provide an affirmative defense for good-faith (i.e., nonracially 
motivated) conduct, or perhaps even for good faith plus hiring standards 
that are entirely reasonable.”202 
Also, if Congress had intended for disparate impact to provide an 
alternative method of establishing intentional discrimination, then the 
remedies for disparate impact would mirror those of disparate treatment.  
This, however, is not the case: the remedies for disparate impact are 
more limited than for disparate treatment.  For example, compensatory 
and punitive damages are not available for disparate impact cases.  
Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that a plaintiff may 
recover compensatory and punitive damages for claims of “unlawful 
intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful 
because of its disparate impact).”203  Additionally, the burdens of 
 
200. The modes of proof for disparate treatment include “(1) direct vs. indirect modes of 
proof; (2) individual vs. pattern and practice cases or class actions; and (3) single motive vs. 
mixed motives cases.”  Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious 
Motive In Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 448 (2000).  McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981), provided an indirect method of proving intent for individual cases.  
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334–43 (1977), developed a method of proof for cases 
involving a pattern or practice of discrimination.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins addressed the 
issue of mixed motives.  490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)), as recognized 
in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
201. Sullivan, supra note 43, at 1522. 
202. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
203. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)); see also 
Penn Lerblance, Introducing the Americans with Disabilities Act: Promises and Challenges, 27 
U.S.F. L. REV. 149, 157 (1992) (“The equitable remedies for employment discrimination 
available under Title VII and the ADA were expanded in cases of intentional discrimination (not 
disparate impact cases) by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to include compensatory and punitive 
damages and the right to a jury trial. Compensatory damages include future pecuniary losses, 
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary 
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production and proof differ for disparate treatment and disparate impact.  
These differences suggest that “disparate impact is not merely a 
surrogate proof method for intentional discrimination, but instead is a 
distinct theory aimed more broadly at practices that disproportionately 
burden protected groups, whether or not intent to discriminate is 
present.”204 
2.  Implicit Bias 
Another possible defense for Title VII’s disparate impact provision 
against an Equal Protection challenge is that it serves a compelling 
interest by remedying unconscious or implicit bias.  Unconscious or 
implicit bias is bias that occurs subconsciously, beyond our awareness 
and control.205 
This section describes the science of implicit social cognition, which 
studies subconscious mental processes and the results of implicit bias 
research.  After a discussion of the implications of implicit bias in the 
workplace and the magnitude and pervasiveness of implicit bias, this 
section explains why disparate impact might be needed to remedy 
implicit bias.  Additionally, this section examines the reliability of 
implicit bias research and whether disparate impact can serve to correct 
implicit bias.  Finally, this section concludes that disparate impact’s 
reliance on racial classifications to correct implicit bias does not serve a 
compelling interest because of the inconclusive results of implicit bias 
studies and contradictory interpretations of those studies. 
a.  The Science of Implicit Social Cognition 
Studies show that bias occurs without our awareness.  The science of 
implicit social cognition “examines those mental processes that operate 
without conscious awareness or conscious control but nevertheless 
influence fundamental evaluations of individuals and groups.”206  
Implicit social cognition science describes stereotypes and biases as a 
result of human cognitive processing that categorizes persons and 
experiences in order to make sense of the information encountered 
 
losses. Punitive damages are authorized if the employer acted with malice or with reckless 
indifference.”). 
204. Sullivan, supra note 43, at 1524. 
205. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 337 (1987) (noting that hidden prejudice has become 
the prevalent form of racism as society increasingly rejects racial prejudice as immoral and 
unproductive). 
206. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Symposium on Behavioral Realism: Fair Measures: A 
Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006). 
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daily.207  Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger explains, “Categories and 
categorization permit us to identify objects, make predictions about the 
future, infer the existence of unobservable traits or properties, and 
attribute the causation of events. . . . Categories are guardians against 
complexity.”208  As Professor Charles Lawrence first brought to light in 
his seminal work, stereotypes and biases are the result of the normal 
process of categorization that takes place at the subconscious level.209  
The cognitive bias theory posits that biases210 are cognitive, not 
motivational, and occur without our self-awareness.  Consequently, 
biases can be “both unintentional and unconscious.”211 
 
207. McGinley, supra note 200, at 423. 
208. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1189 (1995). 
209. See Lawrence, supra note 205, at 337 (“Cognitivists see the process of ‘categorization’ 
as one common source of racial and other stereotypes. All humans tend to categorize in order to 
make sense of experience. Too many events occur daily for us to deal successfully with each one 
on an individual basis; we must categorize in order to cope.”); see also Krieger, supra note 208, at 
1188 (“To function at all, we must design strategies for simplifying the perceptual environment 
and acting on less-than-perfect information. A major way we accomplish both goals is by creating 
categories.”). 
210. Implicit bias or cognitive bias theory originates from the science of implicit social 
cognition.  To aid the exploration of this theory, it is necessary to set out a few definitions. 
The terms “stereotyping,” “prejudice,” and “discrimination,” as used in psychology, 
refer to different aspects of category-based reactions to people from groups perceived 
to differ significantly from one’s own. Stereotyping is generally understood as the 
cognitive component of these category-based reactions: the part arising from and 
relating to the thought process, by which we process information and assign meaning 
to experience. Prejudice is a term with a fairly broad range of meanings; as used in the 
social-psychological literature, it can refer either to a subject’s immediate emotional 
response to a target group (e.g., pity, anger, fear), or to the attitudes or beliefs that 
result from this response (e.g., contempt, inferiority). [Prejudice] refer[s] to the 
affective, or emotional, component of these reactions: how one feels about a member 
of a different group, or about that group generally. In order to distinguish between the 
two potential meanings, [bias] refer[s] to the attitudes and beliefs that result from 
affective prejudice . . . . Discrimination refers to how people implement their 
stereotypic thoughts and prejudicial feelings in dealing with members of different 
groups: refusing to hire them, marry them, speak to them, etc. 
Elizabeth E. Theran, “Free to Be Arbitrary and . . . Capricious”: Weight-Based Discrimination 
and the Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 11 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 116–17 
(2001) (alteration in original).  For other definitions of “bias,” “prejudice,” and “discrimination,” 
see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1035–40 (2006). 
 Additionally, it is helpful to understand the distinction between motive and intent: “Motive is 
what prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the 
act is done or omitted.”  Krieger, supra note 208, at 1171 (citing Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 
1063, 1066 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
211. Krieger, supra note 208, at 1188.  For additional discussion of implicit bias, see Samuel 
R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
477 (2007) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Implicit Bias]; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and 
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The study of social implicit cognition has broad implications when 
applied to employment.  Employers operating on biases are “not 
necessarily withholding their ‘true’ attitudes and beliefs but rather . . . 
they are unable to know the contents of their mind.”212  If people are 
unaware of their biases, then discrimination resulting from cognitive 
biases can occur in the workplace without the decision maker’s 
awareness.   
Professor Jerry Kang points out that “the presence of implicit bias 
can produce discrimination by causing the very basis of evaluation, 
merit, to be mismeasured.”213  For example, in one study by the Civil 
Rights Investigations Project of the Legal Assistance Foundation of 
Metropolitan Chicago, resumes of applicants with equivalent 
qualifications and experience were sent to employers who had posted 
job openings.214  The applicants were African-American and Caucasian 
females; the race of the applicants was easily discernable from their 
names and addresses that were provided on the resumes.215  The results 
showed that Caucasian applicants were 21% more likely to be contacted 
for an interview than their African-American counterparts.216  In 
another component of the same study, when African-American 
applicants with stronger qualifications applied in person, the Caucasian 
applicants were 16% more likely to be offered the position.217  
Additionally, the study showed differences in the wages being offered.  
The employers offered Caucasian applicants an average of thirty-six 
hours of work a week, which amounted to $16,600 per year, whereas 
the African-American applicants received offers for twenty-eight hours 
per week, amounting to $12,900 per year.218  This study illustrates the 
 
the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, 
Structural Turn]; Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of 
Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1489 (2005); Kang & Banaji, supra note 206, at 1063; Lawrence, supra note 205; 
McGinley, supra note 200, at 417–18; Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 210. 
212. Kang & Banaji, supra note 206, at 1071. 
213. Id. at 1066. 
214. Michael L. Foreman et al., The Continuing Relevance of Race-Conscious Remedies and 
Programs in Integrating the Nation’s Workforce, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 81, 87 & n.26 
(2004) (citing LEEANN LODDER ET AL., CHI. URB. LEAGUE, RACIAL PREFERENCE AND 
SUBURBAN EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2003)).  Similar research conducted in Boston and 
Chicago by Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan revealed similar biases for the 
Caucasian applicants.  Kang, supra note 211, at 1515–16. 
215. Foreman, supra note 214, at 87. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
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effects of discrimination on the “mismeasurement” of qualifications and 
merit. 
The susceptibility to unconscious bias reaches beyond employers, 
though employers are most relevant to the present discussion.  The 
Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) demonstrated that the magnitude and 
pervasiveness of bias219 reach all groups.  The IAT measured “group-
valence and group-trait associations that underlie attitudes and 
stereotypes.”220  Since the availability of the IAT in 1998221 for the 
public to self-administer via the Internet,222 researchers have collected 
data from over three million tests from individuals who have visited the 
IAT website.223  The studies measured the extent of participants’ 
unconsciously-held biases against outwardly-expressed biases that they 
self-reported.  The IAT showed that not only did people have an 
implicit bias against traditionally disadvantaged groups,224 but also that 
they have greater implicit bias in favor of the advantaged group.225  
Americans held implicit biases against “Blacks, Latinos, Jews, Asians, 
non-Americans, women, gays, and the elderly.”226  Additionally, this 
implicit bias against socially disadvantaged groups was not limited to 
Americans but extended to populations in other countries.227  In sum, 
the IAT revealed that regardless of their race or where they live, people 
are unaware of their preference for or against a particular social group. 
 
219. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 211, at 966 (concluding the “pervasiveness of implicit 
bias . . . was clearly demonstrated by the data”). 
220. Id. at 952. 
221. Id. at 955. 
222. The IAT can be taken at https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). 
223. Kang & Banaji, supra note 206, at 1072. 
224. The “disadvantaged” groups consisted of the following categories: “African-
American[s],” “Asians,” “Canadian[s],” those from “foreign places,” “gay people,” “Muslims,” 
“old people,” the “poor,” “fat people,” and those from “Japan.”  Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 
211, at 957. 
225. Id. at 955.  Professor Kang describes numerous other fascinating studies, such as the 
math test, shooter bias test, and resume test, that all indicate implicit bias.  Kang, supra note 211, 
at 1515–29. 
226. Kang, supra note 211, at 1512. 
227. Id. 
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Specifically, the Race IAT228 found a significant discrepancy 
between the amount of preference people openly acknowledged for 
certain racial groups through surveys and the implicit bias they 
unconsciously held.229  A central finding in these studies is that most 
people were implicitly biased in favor of European-Americans over 
African-Americans.230  Only among African-Americans was there an 
equal implicit bias for European-Americans and African-Americans 
alike.231  Strikingly, the IAT showed that even among African-
Americans, there is significant lack of awareness of their own 
favoritism toward European-Americans despite their outward 
expressions of preference for their own race.232 
What are the implications of the IAT for real world behavior?  Some 
scholars conclude that “implicit bias plays a causal role in 
discrimination”233 and implicit bias measured by the IAT is predictive 
of discriminatory behavior.234 
 
228. In the Race IAT, the program presents faces for the participants to identify as European-
American or African-American.  Next, participants identify which among the words presented are 
pleasant-meaning, as opposed to unpleasant-meaning.  Then, the participant distinguishes among 
the categories in random order.  The participant is instructed to respond by pressing a particular 
key when African-American faces or pleasant words appear, and to press another key when 
European-American faces or unpleasant words appear.  This same exercise is completed for 
European-American faces and pleasant words, which requires pressing a different key than when 
the participant sees African-American faces or unpleasant words.  Greenwald & Krieger, supra 
note 211, at 952–53.  The IAT measures the speed of the responses.  The speed with which a 
person responds to a particular pairing (e.g., European-American with pleasant words) shows the 
strength of preference for that association.  The Race IAT shows a quicker response time among 
American participants when European-American faces are paired with pleasant words, indicating 
a stronger association than when African-American faces are paired with pleasant words.  Id. at 
953. 
229. Approximately 40% of Caucasian participants outwardly expressed a preference in favor 
of European-Americans, but the IAT showed that 71.5% of Caucasians actually held an implicit 
bias in favor of European-Americans.  Id. at 958. 
230. See id. (highlighting that 60.5% of Hispanics and 67.5% of Asian and Pacific Islanders 
held an implicit bias toward European-Americans). 
231. See id. (showing that 34.1% of African-Americans implicitly favored other African-
Americans, while 32.4% held an implicit bias in favor of European-Americans). 
232. The IAT revealed that the implicit bias of African-Americans in favor of European-
Americans was significantly higher than explicitly reported on surveys.  Only 4.8% of African-
Americans explicitly reported being favorably biased in favor of European-Americans, but the 
IAT showed 32.4% of African-Americans were biased in favor of European-Americans.  Id. 
233. Id. at 966. 
234. See id. (noting there is a substantial and actively accumulating body of evidence that 
supports this assertion); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 
1034 (2006) (explaining how subtle forms of bias “can latently distort” information on which 
employment decisions are based); Kang, supra note 211, at 1514 (asserting that the IAT 
accurately predicts disparate behavior even when one explicitly self-reports a commitment to 
racial equality). 
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b.  Disparate Impact as a Remedy for Implicit Bias 
If implicit bias results in discrimination, one compelling interest for 
the disparate impact provision’s racial classifications may be its ability 
to correct implicit bias.  Disparate impact is needed because disparate 
treatment is inadequate to address implicit bias.  Disparate treatment’s 
ability to remedy implicit bias is theoretically and practically limited by 
its centering liability on intent.235  A focus on employer intent236—the 
state of mind of the employer when the discriminatory act is done—
presumes that employers are cognizant of their discrimination.237  Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins238 is illustrative of this presumption.  In this sex 
discrimination case, the Court evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence 
in establishing that sexual stereotyping played a role in the employer’s 
evaluation of the employee’s candidacy for partnership.  Justice 
Brennan stated: 
 
235. The Court in Watson recognized the limitation of disparate treatment.  See Watson v. 
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (“[E]ven if one assumed that any such 
discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, the problem of 
subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain.”).  Many scholars have also noted this 
limitation of disparate treatment as a remedy for employers’ implicit bias.  See, e.g., Green, supra 
note 39, at 119 (“[J]udicial responses in the individual disparate treatment context illustrate the 
inadequacy of a conception of discrimination that focuses on a particular decisionmaker’s state of 
mind at a discrete point in time to address the subtle, ongoing operation of discriminatory bias 
common in the modern workplace.”); Krieger, supra note 208, at 1213 (explaining that Wilson v. 
Stroh, 9 F.2d 942 (6th Cir.1992), illustrates this shortfall, because although the plaintiff proved 
that his immediate supervisor’s conduct was motivated by racial animus, he could not prove that 
the ultimate decisionmaker was racially motivated, and therefore lost); Lawrence, supra note 205, 
at 322 (“Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are 
influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional—in the sense 
that certain outcomes are self-consciously sought—nor unintentional—in the sense that the 
outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker’s beliefs, desires, and 
wishes.”); McGinley, supra note 200, at 417–18 (cautioning against how oversimplifying the 
definition of intent distorts the current nature of prejudice and how it results in discriminatory 
behavior). 
236. Some courts have applied a strict interpretation of intent: “Discrimination is about actual 
knowledge, and real intent, not constructive knowledge and assumed intent.”  Silvera v. Orange 
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., 
Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 800 (11th Cir. 2000)); see also Pressley v. Haeger, 977 F.2d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 
1992) (“Racial discrimination is an intentional wrong. An empty head means no discrimination. 
There is no ‘constructive intent,’ and constructive knowledge does not show actual intent.”). 
237. Professor Charles Lawrence points out that “[b]y insisting that a blameworthy perpetrator 
be found before the existence of racial discrimination can be acknowledged, the Court creates an 
imaginary world where discrimination does not exist unless it was consciously intended.”  
Lawrence, supra note 205, at 324–25; see also Krieger, supra note 208, at 1213 
(“Decisionmaking is not . . . structurally disjoined from those perceptual and inferential processes 
which compromise it.”). 
238. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). 
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In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment 
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the 
decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, 
one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a 
woman. In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who 
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that 
she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.239 
The Court conceptualized a framework for disparate treatment liability 
that rests not just on showing that an employer treated an employee 
differently, but that the employer took such actions because of the 
employee’s race or other traits—in other words, that the employer was 
aware of its own motives.  If, according to social cognition studies, 
people are unconscious of their biases when they act, it would be 
difficult to use employer intent as a method of counteracting implicit 
bias.240 
On the other hand, disparate impact is not restrained by intent and 
may be a more appropriate mechanism for correcting the discriminatory 
effects of implicit bias.  One way disparate impact may mute the effects 
of implicit bias is by increasing diversity within the workforce.  Some 
studies support the conclusion that the level of implicit bias may be 
reduced by diversity.241  The evidence shows that implicit bias can be 
affected merely by exposing an IAT participant to another person of a 
different race in the room.242  In one study, IAT participants took the 
test with an African-American experimenter in the room and took the 
test at another time with a Caucasian experimenter in the room.243  The 
presence of the African-American experimenter rather than the 
Caucasian experimenter reduced the level of implicit bias.244  Another 
study measured the effect of pairing test takers with different racial 
partners.245  Caucasian IAT participants who were paired with an 
African-American partner showed less implicit bias than when paired 
 
239. Id. 
240. Professor David Oppenheimer has proposed a theory of negligent discrimination for 
employer liability resulting from unconscious stereotyping.  See generally David Benjamin 
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993) (proposing that an 
employer would be held liable under the negligent supervision theory for failing to take 
reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, knowing or having reason to know it is occurring, or 
expecting it or having reason to expect it to occur). 
241. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 211, at 981 (specifying that presence of population 
diversity in an environment will reduce the implict bias). 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
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with a Caucasian partner.246  This body of evidence from the IAT 
supports the inference that diversity in the workplace might similarly 
reduce the level of implicit bias. 
c.  Problems with the Rationale that Disparate Impact Can Remedy 
Implicit Bias 
Disparate impact must overcome several hurdles to justify its use of 
racial classifications as a remedy for implicit bias.  First, studies about 
implicit bias are not conclusive because there are doubts about the 
validity of the IAT and the effectiveness of disparate impact to address 
implicit bias.  The IAT is played out like a tennis match in the scholarly 
arena where scholars lob the IAT results back and forth.  Some scholars 
are persuaded by the findings of the IAT, while others like Professors 
Gregory Mitchell and Philip Tetlock challenge the construct and the 
internal and external validity of the IAT, as well as the interpretations of 
IAT results.247  Professors Mitchell and Tetlock argue that “[t]he 
explicit measures of prejudice used in most construct validation studies 
are themselves politically controversial—and open to alternative 
explanations.  For instance, measures of modern, symbolic, and aversive 
racism often include items that could easily serve as measures of 
ideological conservatism, traditional values, and the Protestant work 
ethic.”248  A high IAT score can be explained as reflecting empathy for 
a social group, performance anxiety of being characterized racist, or 
awareness of social stereotypes, rather than inwardly held animus.249  
Differences in IAT scores may also be the result of mental flexibility in 
adapting to the changes in testing instructions and hand-eye 
coordination.250  Mitchell and Tetlock caution against making 
conclusions about IAT scores based on differences of milliseconds.251  
They point out that while studies have confirmed a correlation between 
implicit bias and “micro-level” behaviors, such as body language and 
facial expressions, few can link implicit bias with “macro-level” 
behaviors such as engaging in discriminatory employment practices.252 
On the other hand, notwithstanding “some effective points” made by 
Mitchell and Tetlock, Professor Samuel Bagenstos finds redeeming 
 
246. Id. 
247. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 210, at 1031–34. 
248. Id. at 1064. 
249. Id. at 1031. 
250. Id. at 1089–90. 
251. Id. at 1046–47. 
252. Id. at 1051. 
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arguments for applying discrimination law to implicit bias.253  Professor 
Bagenstos explains, “Although they ostensibly attack the ‘science’ of 
implicit bias research, Mitchell and Tetlock’s real target is the 
normative view of antidiscrimination law as reaching beyond acts 
reflecting individual fault of the discriminator.”254  Professor Bagenstos 
concludes that regardless of what implicit bias truly reflects, whether 
animus or empathy or other explanations, the consequence is that it 
limits opportunities for racial groups.255  He argues, “The point of 
antidiscrimination law, however, is not to identify and punish prejudice 
as an inherent personal quality. The point is to prevent and provide 
remedies for conduct that deprive minorities of opportunities.”256 
Consistent with Professor Bagenstos’s recommendation that conduct 
that limits opportunities for racial groups should be prevented, some 
scholars suggest remedies for implicit bias such as removing stereotype 
threats, increasing self-awareness of implicit biases, cloaking social 
categories, and employing debiasing agents.257  Stereotype threat is the 
phenomenon that occurs when people who belong to social groups with 
negative stereotypes about particular capabilities underperform when 
they are reminded of their group identity.258  For example, in one 
experiment, researchers gave a verbal test to African-American and 
Caucasian participants.259  When the participants were told that the test 
measured their intellectual capabilities, the African-American 
participants underperformed compared with the Caucasian 
participants.260  With another group of participants, the researchers told 
them that the test was merely a laboratory task.261  In this situation, 
there was no significant difference between performance of the 
Caucasian and African-American participants.262  Studies on stereotype 
threats showed that this phenomenon negatively affected the 
performance of African-Americans on intellectual tests, women on math 
tests, the elderly on memory tests, and people of low socio-economic 
status on verbal tests.263  Cloaking social categories involves the 
 
253. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, supra note 211, at 479. 
254. Id. at 480–81. 
255. Id. at 485. 
256. Id. at 487. 
257. Kang & Banaji, supra note 206, at 1101–15. 
258. Id. at 1087. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 1088. 
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removal of any identification of social group membership, such as 
names and pictures.264  A debiasing agent is a person who helps to 
break down racial stereotypes265 by having characteristics counter to the 
stereotypes associated with the person’s social group membership: 
“women construction workers, male nurses, Black intellectuals, White 
janitors, Asian CEOs, gay boxers, and elderly marathon runners.”266 
However, while these strategies may combat implicit bias, it remains 
to be seen how they relate to disparate impact.  Disparate impact does 
not rely on these strategies.  In fact, even if an employer were to utilize 
all these strategies, an employer could still be at risk for disparate 
impact liability.  For example, if an employer eliminates stereotype 
threats and cloaks social categories by removing the test taker’s identity 
on an employment test, an employer would find itself defending against 
a disparate impact suit if the test results had a disproportionately 
adverse effect on a racial group.  This, therefore, leads to the question, 
how does disparate impact mitigate implicit bias?  In the prior 
hypothetical, it seems that disparate impact would not serve the purpose 
of detecting bias.  If detecting and mitigating implicit bias were to be a 
compelling purpose for disparate impact, it is necessary to first show the 
relationship between implicit bias and unconscious discriminatory acts 
and then show how disparate impact can be utilized to correct implicit 
bias.  The studies do not provide a definitive answer. 
Additionally, others have found that disparate impact is theoretically 
and practically flawed as a device to provide adequate relief against bias 
in the workplace267 and opportunities for minorities.  Professor Tristin 
Green explains, “[D]isparate impact theory conceptualizes 
discrimination solely at the institutional level, neglecting an exploration 
of the interplay between institutional choices and the operation of 
discriminatory bias in individuals and groups at multiple levels of 
interaction in the workplace.”268  The failure of disparate impact theory, 
according to Professor Green, results from focusing on a “purely 
structural account of discrimination,” rather than on how the structure, 
systems, and dynamics of institutions contribute to discriminatory 
bias.269 
 
264. Id. at 1093. 
265. Id. at 1112. 
266. Id. at 1109. 
267. Green, supra note 39, at 136. 
268. Id. at 138. 
269. Id. 
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d.  Summary 
The ambivalence among scholars about the validity of implicit bias 
tests, the interpretations of that research, and the role of disparate 
impact in providing relief for implicit bias are problematic to defending 
use of racial classification in disparate impact to combat unconscious 
bias.  Operating on the assumption that disparate impact relies on racial 
classification, the Supreme Court is unlikely to sustain the use of a 
“highly suspect tool” such as racial classification without conclusive 
evidence that it serves a compelling purpose.270  The inconclusive 
nature of the research may be the Achilles’ heel to justifying the use of 
disparate impact to mitigate implicit bias as a compelling interest. 
Additionally, the Court is unlikely to respond to using 
antidiscrimination law to redress unconscious bias in which everyone 
engages.  Professor Bagenstos points out: 
If antidiscrimination law is to respond to such bias effectively, the 
concept of wrongful discrimination must expand to embrace not only 
the deviant acts of especially immoral people but also the everyday 
actions of virtually all of us. In the end, because implicit biases draw 
on widely shared cultural understandings, any effort to eliminate those 
biases requires a massive, society-wide effort to change the 
significance of race and gender in our culture. Courts are likely to balk 
at undertaking such a colossal task; they are particularly unlikely to 
conclude that particular employers are at fault for failing to police 
conduct that has been programmed into our brains by overarching 
societal influences.271 
C.  Diversity 
Another rationale for the disparate impact provision’s use of racial 
classifications is that it is necessary to attain a diverse workforce.  This 
 
270. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) (striking down the 
city’s Minority Business Utilization Plan because the city failed to demonstrate a compelling 
governmental interest justifying the plan, which was not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects 
of prior discrimination). 
271. Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 211, at 42–43.  Additionally, Professor Barbara 
Flagg points out: 
To hold both unconscious and conscious race discrimination equally blameworthy is 
also unlikely to produce desirable consequences. First, blaming individuals for 
unconsciously held attitudes may produce paralyzing guilt when the racist character of 
those attitudes comes to light. Furthermore, condemning the individual for matters not 
within his conscious control seems inconsistent with the very concept of 
blameworthiness. Finally, assessing blame for what, in effect, nearly every white 
person does seems equally incongruous. 
Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement 
of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 989 (1993). 
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section explores the contexts in which achieving diversity is compelling 
and if that rationale can be extended to employment.  Specifically, this 
section discusses the Supreme Court’s response to the diversity 
rationale, benefits of diversity, and limitations of the diversity rationale 
to the workplace. 
1.  Diversity Rationale Recognized by the Supreme Court 
a.  Bakke 
Diversity was first recognized as a compelling interest in Bakke.272  
In Bakke, Justice Powell, who announced the judgment,273 considered 
several justifications made by the school for its racially-based 
admissions quota.  First, the school asserted that the purpose of its 
admissions policy was to “reduc[e] the historic deficit of traditionally 
disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession,” 
but Justice Powell rejected this as impermissible racial balancing that 
would unnecessarily burden innocent parties.274  When the school 
defended its program on the interest of “increasing the number of 
physicians who will practice in communities underserved,” Justice 
Powell also rejected this assertion due to the lack of evidence that the 
program was designed to advance that interest.  Finally, the Court 
approved the school’s racial classification for the purpose of “obtaining 
the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student 
body.”275  Justice Powell’s approval of the “attainment of a diverse 
student body” was premised on the academic freedom of institutions of 
higher education, which has been traditionally understood to be 
protected by the First Amendment.276  The Court espoused the view that 
the “‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of 
 
272. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
273. The Grutter Court observed: 
The [Bakke] decision produced six separate opinions, none of which commanded a 
majority of the Court. Four Justices would have upheld the program against all attack 
on the ground that the government can use race to “remedy disadvantages cast on 
minorities by past racial prejudice.” Four other Justices avoided the constitutional 
question altogether and struck down the program on statutory grounds. 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003) (reflecting upon the divided opinions of the Bakke 
Court). 
274. Id. at 323–24 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306–07). 
275. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306. 
276. Id. at 311–12. 
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many peoples”277 and reasoned that the medical school’s admissions 
program would promote a “robust exchange of ideas.”278 
b.  Grutter 
Following Bakke, Grutter reaffirmed that diversity could be a 
compelling interest.279  In Grutter, the law school’s justification for 
considering race in its admissions procedure was for the singular 
purpose of “obtaining ‘the educational benefits that flow from a diverse 
student body.’”280  The law school sought to enroll a “critical mass of 
underrepresented minority students.”281  The school did not define 
diversity solely based on race or ethnicity and allowed for consideration 
of other factors.282 
In defining critical mass, the school stated that it did not focus on a 
particular number or percentage but on attaining “‘meaningful numbers’ 
or ‘meaningful representation,’ . . . a number that encourages 
underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and 
not feel isolated.”283  The purpose of attaining a diverse student body, 
as the law school explained, was not remedial, but to promote “cross-
racial understanding [to help] break down racial stereotypes, . . . enable 
students to better understand persons of different races,” and engender 
“livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting” 
classroom discussions.284 
Grutter unequivocally repudiated the belief that only an interest in 
remedying past discrimination could survive strict scrutiny and held that 
an interest in attaining a diverse student body was a compelling 
purpose.285  Although the Court employed strict scrutiny, it afforded the 
law school deference in the determination that diversity was necessary 
to the educational functions of the school286: “We have long recognized 
that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive 
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university 
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional 
 
277. Id. at 313. 
278. Id.  The Court found that diversity was a compelling interest but invalidated the program 
because it was not narrowly tailored.  Id. at 267. 
279. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
280. Id. 
281. Id. at 316 (internal quotation marks and original alterations omitted). 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
284. Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks and original alterations omitted). 
285. Id. at 328. 
286. Id. 
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tradition.”287  The Court embraced the rationale previously stated in 
Bakke that, consistent with the First Amendment contours of academic 
freedom, a university’s educational prerogatives include the “selection 
of its student body.”288  The Court summarized its reasoning as follows: 
“Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a 
diverse student body is . . . at the heart of the Law School’s proper 
institutional mission, and that ‘good faith’ on the part of a university is 
‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”289 
c.  Parents Involved 
Finally, in Parents Involved, the Court firmly established the 
boundaries of the diversity rationale previously embraced in Grutter.  In 
Parents Involved, the Court rejected the school district’s use of diversity 
as a compelling interest to justify the district’s racially based method of 
school assignments.  The district contended that assigning students to 
schools based on race “help[ed] to reduce racial concentration in 
schools and to ensure that racially concentrated housing patterns do not 
prevent nonwhite students from having access to the most desirable 
schools.”290  The “school district[s] argue[d] that educational and 
broader socialization benefits flow from a racially diverse learning 
environment, and . . . because the diversity they seek is racial 
diversity—not the broader diversity at issue in Grutter—it makes sense 
to promote that interest directly by relying on race alone.”291  The Court 
concluded, however, that the racially based assignments were not 
narrowly tailored to achieve the educational and social benefits sought 
by the districts because the “plans [were] tied to each district’s specific 
racial demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level 
of diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits.”292 
2.  The Benefits of Diversity 
a.  Intrinsic or Extrinsic Value of Diversity 
In the three foregoing cases, the Court endorsed diversity as a 
compelling interest, with some limitations.  But why is diversity 
important?  Is diversity a thing of value in and of itself or merely an 
 
287. Id. at 329. 
288. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
289. Id. 
290. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725 (2007). 
291. Id. at 725–26. 
292. Id. at 726. 
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instrument that brings about favorable consequences?293  These 
questions can be answered by considering a hypothetical.  Assume that 
the students who were educated in the diverse environment at the law 
school in Grutter graduated and each decided to live as hermits on a 
secluded island in total isolation.  The benefits of having cross-racial 
understanding and a robust exchange of ideas from their diverse 
education are of little use to these students as they live in seclusion.  
This example illustrates that diversity has extrinsic value, as opposed to 
unconditional, intrinsic value.294  The compelling nature of diversity is 
reliant on how it can benefit the students’ chosen profession or their 
societal interactions with others.295  If students were to become hermits, 
the diverse education would be of little benefit to society.  The value of 
diversity stems from its usefulness outside of the classroom; otherwise, 
diversity would be merely useful as an academic exercise at the 
university.  Therefore, the value of diversity in the workplace must be 
evaluated at an extrinsic level. 
b.  Business Case for Diversity 
A possible defense for the disparate impact provision is that its use of 
racial classification is necessary for obtaining the benefits flowing from 
diversity for public and private employers.  Relying on “expert studies 
and reports,” the Grutter Court concluded that “student body diversity 
promotes learning outcomes, and better prepares students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as 
professionals.”296  Additionally, the Court endorsed the concept that 
“[t]hese benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American 
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly 
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely 
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”297  The Court also 
accepted the assertions of military leaders that a “highly qualified, 
 
293. See Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1175, 1188–89 
(2009) (discussing that the social good flowing from racial diversity is not intrinsic or 
unconditional, but rather extrinsic, depending on the particular conditions and circumstances in 
which it is present). 
294. Id. 
295. See Pamela S. Karlan, Compelling Interests/Compelling Institutions: Law Schools as 
Constitutional Litigants, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1625 (2007) (pointing out the “concrete nature 
of the [Grutter] Court’s discussion of the way that racially diverse student bodies contribute to 
the extrinsic function of producing members of leadership professions”). 
296. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
297. Id. 
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racially diverse officer corps is essential to the military’s ability to 
fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.”298 
In Justice Scalia’s dissent in Grutter, he pointed out that the benefits 
that the university sought through enrolling a diverse student population 
are “lesson[s] of life”299 and that employers could equally insist on 
using racial classifications to teach these same civic lessons in 
“socialization and good citizenship” to their employees.300  Although 
Justice Scalia was being ironic, the question of whether diversity could 
be equally compelling in the employment context is worth examining 
because the Supreme Court has not reviewed a case that advances 
diversity in an employment decision.  Taxman v. Board of Education of 
Township of Piscataway301 would have been the test case, but the 
parties settled months before oral arguments were scheduled before the 
Supreme Court.302  The issue in Taxman centered on the school board 
invoking its affirmative action program to layoff a Caucasian teacher 
rather than an African-American teacher who was equal in seniority.303  
Although the statistics showed that African-Americans were not 
underrepresented in the school system’s workforce,304 the school board 
retained the African-American teacher because she was the only 
African-American teacher in the Business Education Department.305  
The school board justified its layoff decision based on cultural diversity: 
[The educational objective] was sending a very clear message that we 
feel that our staff should be culturally diverse, our student population 
is culturally diverse and there is a distinct advantage to students, to all 
students, to be made—come into contact with people of different 
cultures, different background, so that they are more aware, more 
tolerant, more accepting, more understanding of people of all 
background.306 
Although the Supreme Court did not have an opportunity to review the 
Taxman case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the diversity 
argument and held that Title VII only permits remedial programs.307 
 
298. Id. at 331 (original alteration omitted). 
299. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
300. Id. at 348. 
301. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997). 
302. Foreman, supra note 214, at 98 nn.114–15. 
303. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551. 
304. Id. at 1550. 
305. Id. at 1551. 
306. Id. at 1552. 
307. Id. at 1567. 
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Diversity has been touted by corporations for increasing productivity 
through the improvement of intra-office dynamics, facilitating unique 
problem solving approaches, and improving the delivery of services and 
development of products for a diverse customer base.308  The following 
discussion will evaluate if the benefits attributable to diversity are 
applicable outside of the classrooms of higher education institutions and 
if there are any limitations to extending the diversity rationale to the 
employment context. 
3.  Critiquing the Diversity Rationale as Applied to Employment 
a.  Similarity to Racial Balancing 
Advancing disparate impact as a method of promoting diversity may 
be vulnerable to an attack that it is an attempt to achieve racial 
balancing.  The Court has reiterated that “racial balance is not to be 
achieved for its own sake.”309  In Parents Involved, the Court rejected 
any attempt to disguise racial balancing as racial diversity or racial 
integration: “Racial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently 
unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 
‘racial diversity.’”310  Lower courts have similarly construed the 
objective of ameliorating under-representation as an effort to relabel 
racial balancing.311 
Courts might suspect disparate impact as an effort to achieve racial 
balancing because of disparate impact’s focus on racial proportions in 
the applicant pool.  Disparate impact necessitates a comparison of the 
representative numbers among each racial group.  In essence, 
application of the four-fifths rule means that there must be a 
representation in the smallest racial group of at least 80% of the largest 
racial group selected.  The failure to attain this proportion in the 
 
308. See Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law 
and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 682–83 (2004) (discussing 
affirmative action and the use of bona fide occupational qualifications in society and in law, 
focusing on policing, education, business, and voting rights); Bryan W. Leach, Note, Race as 
Mission Critical: The Occupational Need Rationale in Military Affirmative Action and Beyond, 
113 YALE L.J. 1093, 1129 (2004) (surveying the various amicus filings in Grutter that concern the 
occupational benefits of racial diversity in a business environment). 
309. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729 (2007) 
(original alteration omitted) (citation omitted). 
310. Id. at 732. 
311. See, e.g., Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 799 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Underrepresentation 
is merely racial balancing in disguise—another way of suggesting that there be optimal 
proportions for the representation of races and ethnic groups . . . .”). 
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applicant pool subjects employers to defending against a prima facie 
case of disparate impact. 
b.  Limited to the Context of Higher Education 
Another substantial hurdle for disparate impact is persuading the 
Court that considerations of diversity should be extended beyond higher 
education.  As Justice O’Connor stated, “Context matters.”312  In 
Parents Involved, the Court emphasized that it upheld the use of racial 
classification in Grutter because of the unique circumstances of 
institutions of higher education.313  In the Court’s analysis, due to “the 
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the 
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition.”314  Justice Roberts chastised the lower courts 
for disregarding the expressed limitation of the Court’s holding “to the 
unique context of higher education” in Grutter.315 
If elementary and secondary schools failed to persuade the Court to 
apply Grutter even within the educational context—albeit not higher 
education—it is not realistic to think that the Court will accept a 
diversity argument in the employment context.  Additionally, in the 
employment context, there is no constitutional principle that must be 
counterbalanced with the prohibition against racial classification that 
would justify extending diversity beyond higher education.  In the 
educational context, the Court articulated sensitivity to the First 
Amendment considerations unique to universities.  No such unique 
considerations exist in the employment context.  It is unlikely, therefore, 
that the Court will extend the diversity argument beyond the context of 
higher education. 
At least one lower court has rejected an attempt to apply the diversity 
rationale outside the classroom.  In Lomack v. City of Newark, the Third 
Circuit rejected the city’s race-based transfers of firefighters for 
“creat[ing] a rainbow at each firehouse.”316  The city argued that 
integrating its fire companies led to increased camaraderie, sharing of 
information, and support.317  The court found this argument 
 
312. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003). 
313. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725. 
314. Id. at 724 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329). 
315. Id. at 725 (“The Court in Grutter expressly articulated key limitations on its holding—
defining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context of higher 
education—but these limitations were largely disregarded by the lower courts in extending 
Grutter to uphold race-based assignments in elementary and secondary schools.”). 
316. 463 F.3d 303, 305 (3d Cir. 2006). 
317. Id. at 309. 
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unpersuasive because while the benefits attributable to diversity were 
important to the educational mission of academic institutions, they were 
not central to firefighting.318 
c.  Studies Provide Mixed Results Regarding Benefits of Diversity 
Related to the issue of whether the diversity rationale can be 
extended beyond the higher education context is whether using diversity 
in the workplace produces benefits sufficient to justify the disparate 
impact provision’s use of racial classifications.  If the Court were to 
extend diversity beyond higher education, there must be a showing that 
the social good flowing from diversity that benefits education would 
also benefit businesses.  The following discussion evaluates whether 
diversity in the workplace can increase efficiency and profits by 
enhancing inter-office cooperation and breaking down stereotypes. 
i.  Increasing Efficiency and Profits 
Studies show mixed results about the benefits of diversity in the 
workplace.319  Some studies find that diversity has a positive effect in 
the employment context.320  Psychological research shows that 
heterogeneous groups offer more creative solutions to problems.321 
On the other hand, other studies show that diversity has no effect—or 
worse, a negative effect—at work.322  Research by the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology’s Sloan School of Management found that 
“racial and gender diversity do[es] not have the positive effect on 
performance proposed by those with a more optimistic view of the role 
diversity can play in organizations.”323  Some research suggested that 
 
318. Id. at 310. 
319. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 1, 84 & n.348 (2000). 
320. Allan G. King & Jeremy W. Hawpe, Gratz v. Grutter: Lessons for Pursuing Diversity in 
the Workplace, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 41, 59 (2004). 
321. Steven A. Ramirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VII, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 127, 
135 (2000). 
322. In terms of national costs, studies show that the goal of advancing affirmative action has 
had a negative effect.  See Jared M. Mellott, Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action 
in Employment After Grutter: The Case for Containment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091, 1155 
n.335 (2006) (describing the study of two economists who estimated that “affirmative action 
caused businesses to lose $225 billion annually in direct, indirect, and opportunity costs” and 
another study that “estimate[d] that affirmative action in public contracting with private 
businesses cost the taxpayers approximately $2 billion in 2004, based on the higher bids 
submitted by minority subcontracting firms that primary contractors are induced to accept”). 
323. King & Hawpe, supra note 320, at 58 (quoting Thomas Kochan et al., The Effect of 
Diversity on Business Performance: Report of the Diversity Research Network, 42 HUM. RES. 
MGMT. 3, 17 (2003)). 
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whether diversity increases productivity depends on the group members 
buying in to the value of diversity.324  If groups do not value diversity 
as enhancing their work, “diverse groups are less likely to benefit from 
their diversity and may even perform less well than homogeneous 
groups that do not have to negotiate the kinds of conflict and 
communication issues that often beset diverse groups.”325  While group 
diversity may broaden the “range of ideas considered and of alternatives 
generated,”326 group diversity may also produce “lower levels of 
satisfaction and commitment, lower performance evaluations for those 
who are different, and high levels of absenteeism and turnover.”327  
Overall, the research concluded that “diversity is most likely to impede 
group functioning.”328 
ii.  Breaking Down Stereotypes 
Additionally, research showed mixed results regarding whether 
diversity can break down stereotypes by increasing contact with 
individuals of different social groups.  As described earlier, one study 
showed that when Caucasian IAT participants are paired with an 
African-American partner, or take the test with an African-American 
experimenter in the room, their implicit bias is reduced.329 
Another study, however, showed an opposite result.  In that study, 
participants played a video game in which the objective was to shoot 
persons who were armed with a gun.330  The game flashed images of 
Caucasians or African-Americans; in these images, the persons were 
either holding a gun or a harmless object.331  The participants more 
often shot the African-American, believing the person to be armed when 
he was not, and they more often failed to shoot the Caucasian whom 
they mistakenly believed was unarmed when he was actually armed.332  
Strikingly, both African-American and Caucasian participants had 
“shooter bias” against African-Americans, and the “shooter bias” was 
 
324. David B. Wilkins, Symposium: Brown at Fifty, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” 
to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate 
of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1587 (2004). 
325. Id. 
326. Estlund, supra note 319, at 27. 
327. Id. at 28 (quoting Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. O’Reilly III, Demography and 
Diversity in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, 20 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 77, 116 
(1998) (internal citations omitted)). 
328. Id. (quoting Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 327, at 120). 
329. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 211, at 981. 
330. Kang & Banaji, supra note 206, at 1104. 
331. Id. 
332. Id. 
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correlated to contacts with African-Americans.333  If the participants’ 
self-reports are true about their amount of contact with African-
Americans, then the study “shows that increased interracial contact 
produces a greater tendency to ‘shoot’ African-Americans.”334  
Professors Kang and Banaji concluded that “research supports the value 
of intergroup contact to ameliorate negative attitudes (also called 
‘prejudice’).  However, intergroup contact may not counteract negative 
stereotypes.”335  Thus, Professors Kang’s and Banaji’s conclusions 
about the “shooter bias” study336 would appear to contradict the 
assumption that increased diversity would lead to decreased stereotypes.  
The contradictory results of the research on whether diversity increases 
productivity and reduces stereotypes undermine the argument for 
diversity as a compelling interest for disparate impact. 
d.  Benefits Accrue to Businesses, Not Individuals 
Assuming arguendo that research supports the conclusion that 
diversity reduces stereotypes in the workplace and fosters interracial 
relations, one must pause to ask how that benefits the individual 
employee.  While seemingly altruistic for advancing diversity, 
businesses support diversity not to promote the cause of civil rights, but 
to increase efficiency for the ultimate goal of increasing profits.337  
Professor David Wilkins points out, “[N]ot every diverse viewpoint is 
valued by corporate America. . . . Despite all the talk about fostering 
multiple viewpoints, managers are interested only in ‘opinions about the 
best way to build or sell cars or whatever other good is being produced 
by the business.’”338  Businesses may not encourage diverse ideas that 
are disruptive to maximizing the corporate bottom line, which in turn 
may cause minorities to withhold their diverse expressions.  
Consequently, this reinforces minorities’ perceptions that their diversity 
matters little in the workforce.339 
 
333. Id. 
334. Id. 
335. Id. at 1105. 
336. I rely on the studies as presented by other scholars.  An independent determination of the 
reliability or validity of the studies is beyond my expertise and beyond the scope of this Article. 
337. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. 
J. SOC. 1589, 1591 (2001) (“[K]ey proponents of the new managerial model—managers and 
management consultants—explicitly dissociate their efforts from civil rights law, arguing that 
diversity is directly valuable to organizational efficiency and important in its own right rather 
than because it might promote legal ideals.”). 
338. Wilkins, supra note 324, at 1587–88 (quoting Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 573, 589 (2000)). 
339. See id. (arguing that minorities with diverse viewpoints may not offer their divergent 
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In contrast, in the educational context, the social goods asserted as 
flowing from a diverse student population benefit the students directly.  
If diversity does in fact foster cross-racial understanding by breaking 
down racial stereotypes and promoting livelier and more enlightening 
discussions in the classroom, students are the recipients of those 
benefits.  An argument can be made that the university is also the 
recipient of benefits flowing from a diverse student body.  A diverse 
student body could improve the image of the school, which may impact 
financial contributions to the university, attract desirable faculty who 
might not otherwise consider working at the university, and attract 
employers to recruit at the university.  However, even conceding that 
the university may be positively impacted from having a diverse student 
body, those benefits are directly transferable to the students.  The ability 
to attract faculty and recruiters has a direct positive effect on students.  
Contributions to the school can result in improved resources for 
students and better facilities.  Diversity is a compelling purpose in the 
educational context because it is centered on the individual.  On the 
other hand, the rationale for increasing diversity in the workplace 
appears to be employer-centered and is contrary to the focus of the 
Equal Protection Clause and disparate impact provision on protecting 
individuals.340  In the end, increasing corporate profit margins hardly 
seems compelling. 
An argument, however, could be made that the benefits accruing to 
the employer, whether private or public, benefit the public at large.  The 
contributions of diversity, such as enhancement of interracial group 
dynamics and creative thinking, help to improve the development of 
products and delivery of services to the public.  But even conceding this 
argument, there is no direct benefit flowing to the diversity contributor; 
in this regard, minorities who contribute diversity benefits can be seen 
as a means to an end for public and private employers alike. 
e.  Leads to Stereotyping, Not Necessarily Viewpoint Diversity 
Another concern with advancing diversity for the social good it 
generates is the risk of perpetuating stereotypes.  Although diversity is 
extolled for its ability to break down stereotypes through increasing 
contact between diverse groups, it may actually lead to stereotyping.  
The law school in Grutter disavowed “its need for critical mass on ‘any 
belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express some 
 
opinions for fear of being perceived as too diverse). 
340. For a discussion relating to the protection intended by the Equal Protection Clause, see 
supra Part II. 
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characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’”341  But the 
justification that classroom discussions are livelier and more interesting 
with a diverse group of students is premised on the notion, or even 
expectation, that minorities will have a different viewpoint, or at least 
different experiences, than nonminorities. 
Professor Sanford Levinson offers a counter explanation: 
Race and ethnicity, . . . at least on occasion, may act as proxies, not so 
much for holding specific views, but for the probability of being 
deeply interested (and at least somewhat knowledgeable) at all in 
certain issues, i.e., those issues most germane to the group in question. 
. . . African-Americans are more likely to be concerned with the 
problems facing African-Americans—and, for that matter, more aware 
of the complexities and divisions within the group of those comprising 
the community of African-Americans—than are non-African-
Americans.342 
But this explanation also seems to be premised on a stereotype—the 
presumption that a person is more likely to be attuned to the matters 
concerning that individual’s group. 
A related concern is that the rationale for attaining critical mass of 
diverse employees is similar to the racial isolation justification.  Critical 
mass, like the “racial isolation justification[,] is extremely suspect 
because it assumes that [individuals] cannot function or express 
themselves unless they are surrounded by sufficient number of persons 
of like race or ethnicity.”343  This discussion serves as a reminder that 
whether extolling diversity in the educational or employment context, 
one must proceed with caution to not perpetuate the very stereotypes 
that were intended to be mitigated. 
f.  Some Benefits of Robust Discussions Flowing from Diversity Apply 
Only to Particular Contexts 
An additional impediment to advancing the diversity rationale is that 
the benefits of livelier discussions resulting from a diverse group may 
be relevant to limited contexts.  Assuming that diversity correlates with 
diverse viewpoints, the richer discussions that emanate from diverse 
groups would be useful to occupations in which group discussions are 
central to the job at hand.  For example, having a lively conversation 
with diverse coworkers is unlikely to have much impact in the execution 
 
341. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (quoting Brief for Respondent at 30, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)). 
342. Levinson, supra note 338, at 597. 
343. Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 799 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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of a janitor’s duties.  Robust discussions are largely relevant to jobs 
involving problem-solving or where an exchange of ideas is helpful. 
Even granting Professor Levinson’s point that diversity increases the 
probability that there will be some who are deeply interested in issues 
germane to their group membership, one wonders if this correlation is 
relevant to other contexts.  Would deep interest in matters concerning a 
particular social group be relevant to a chemistry class discussion?  Or 
how would having an interest germane to an individual’s social group 
apply in the workforce?  Would the fact that African-Americans are 
more concerned about issues facing African-Americans have any 
application to a lone toll booth operator or an assembly-line factory 
worker?  Even if one conceptualizes diversity as having a likely 
correlation of providing persons deeply interested in matters concerning 
their racial group, this alternative conception may not be sufficient to 
extend the application of the diversity rationale to the workplace. 
g.  Adverse Effects of Diversity in the Workplace 
Finally, the last concern that the diversity rationale raises is that while 
diversity is advanced for the social good that may flow from it, the 
diversity rationale may have the unintended consequence of harming 
minorities in some segments of the workforce.  The diversity rationale 
may lead employers who want to capitalize on the benefits of diversity 
to exploit employees for a particular market, matching the employee to 
the race of the clients.344  As one African-American lawyer explained: 
“They expect you to know every black politician in the city and every 
black businessman in the state.”345  Race matching results in 
detrimental effects for some minorities because they may receive the 
bulk of the undesirable assignments, be confined to niches, and have 
limited opportunity to branch out.346  This effect is notable among 
professionals like lawyers, doctors, and securities and financial agents, 
whose jobs are dependent on developing clientele.347  In these 
professions, African-Americans are more likely to be assigned to serve 
 
344. Wilkins, supra note 324, at 1594; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work: 
A Title VII Critique of Constitutional Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408, 1440–41 (2006) 
(discussing that employers may segregate and exploit minority employees by assigning them to 
serve minority communities). 
345. Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 AM. U. 
L. REV. 669, 743 (1997) (citation omitted). 
346. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 344, at 1441; Wilkins, supra note 324, at 1595–98 (noting 
that African-American lawyers are often engaged in practice areas where their race might be a 
valuable credential). 
347. Eric Grodsky & Devah Pager, The Structure of Disadvantage: Individual and 
Occupational Determinants of the Black-White Wage Gap, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 542, 560 (2001). 
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minority communities that are a less affluent client base.348  Therefore, 
the diversity rationale has potential to cause unintended consequences 
such as increasing racial stereotypes and restricting opportunities for 
minorities, which may defeat the use of disparate impact to promote 
diversity as a compelling interest. 
D.  Role Model 
Another defense that may shield the disparate impact provision from 
an Equal Protection Clause challenge is the rationale that the 
provision’s use of racial classifications is necessary to provide role 
models.  A role model is someone whose behavior is emulated by 
another.349  A role model is distinguishable from a mentor in several 
respects.  Those in a mentor-mentee relationship have a reciprocal 
interest in each other that is personal.350  A role model differs because 
the role model does not need to take an interest in the emulator and may 
not even know the emulator personally.351  This section explores the 
possibilities for applying a role model rationale in the workplace. 
1.  The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Role Model Justification 
a.  Rejected in Wygant 
The Court first considered the adequacy of the role model theory as 
justification for racial classifications in Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education.352  The school board defended its retention of a less senior 
minority teacher because it sought to provide minority role models for 
the minority students.  The district court upheld the layoff procedures, 
explaining that “[t]eachers are role-models for their students. More 
specifically, minority teachers are role-models for minority students.  
This is vitally important because societal discrimination has often 
deprived minority children of other role-models.”353 
The Supreme Court rejected the role model rationale as a means for 
correcting societal discrimination.354  Additionally, the Court criticized 
 
348. Id. at 561. 
349. Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 
1389 (1996). 
350. Id. 
351. Id. 
352. 476 U.S. 267, 275–76 (1986). 
353. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff’d, 746 
F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), rev’d, 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
354. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (“Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a 
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. The role model theory announced by the District 
Court and the resultant holding typify this indefiniteness.”). 
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the role model theory because it lacked a “logical stopping point” as it 
permitted “discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point 
required by any legitimate remedial purpose.”355  The Court was also 
concerned that the role model theory could have the unintended 
consequence of allowing employers to “escape” remedial obligations by 
justifying its hiring of few African-American teachers on the low 
enrollment of African-American students.356  The Court reasoned, 
“Carried to its logical extreme, the idea that black students are better off 
with black teachers could lead to the very system the Court rejected in 
Brown v. Board of Education.”357 
b.  Accepted in Ambach v. Norwick 
Although the Court has rejected the need to provide role models as a 
justification for racial classifications, it has accepted the role model 
justification for sustaining alienage classifications.  In Ambach v. 
Norwick, the Court upheld a prohibition against employing elementary 
and secondary school teachers who lacked the intent to become United 
States citizens.358  The Court’s holding rested on the belief that teachers 
occupy a unique position to impart lessons in civics and citizenship.  
The Court reasoned, “[A] teacher serves as a role model for his 
students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their perceptions 
and values . . . toward government, the political process, and a citizen’s 
social responsibilities.”359 
Wygant and Ambach would appear to be inconsistent, but there is 
little that can be gleaned from Wygant about whether the Court would 
regard teachers as proper role models.  The Wygant Court invalidated 
the role model justification because it was grounded in remedying 
societal discrimination and was not narrowly tailored.360 
2.  Benefits of Providing Role Models 
One seeks out a role model to aspire to achieve the role model’s level 
of success in a given profession.  One basis for the role model rationale 
is that a role model of the same racial group as the emulator will 
 
355. Id. at 275. 
356. Id. at 276. 
357. Id. (citation omitted). 
358. 441 U.S. 68, 72–81 (1979). 
359. Id. at 78–79. 
360. Chief Judge Posner has opined that “[t]here are many weak arguments for discrimination, 
and the ‘role model’ theory,  at least to the extent that it has been developed in the cases to date, is 
one, because of lack of substantiation and a well-nigh unlimited reach.”  Wittmer v. Peters, 87 
F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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enhance the emulator’s ability to achieve.  This theory has merit for 
mentors and mentees because their relationship depends on their 
comfort level with each other, which would affect the guidance that the 
mentor imparts.361  However, there is no empirical evidence to support 
the notion that a role model who shares the same racial background as 
the emulator will have “qualitatively more influence” than someone of a 
different race.362  Additionally, there is no evidence that shows an 
emulator will achieve his or her goals better or faster with a role model 
of the same race.363 
Although there is a lack of empirical evidence to support the role 
model theory, it may not be dispositive of whether the role model theory 
should be applied in the workplace.  In Ambach, there was no evidence 
to support the Court’s inference that children are more receptive to civic 
lessons that are taught, whether explicitly or implicitly, by teachers who 
are United States citizens.  Despite the lack of evidence, the Court 
endorsed the role model theory in the context of alienage classifications. 
Perhaps the reason for providing minorities with role models from 
their racial group can be justified beyond consideration of empirical 
evidence.  Another justification for providing role models is the 
following: 
[G]iven the dearth of minorities and women in certain professions, it . 
. . [is] necessary for aspiring minority and female role occupants to see 
minorities and women in those roles to reassure themselves that they 
can indeed occupy those roles and perform those functions and to 
show them how those who share similarly historical and institutional 
vulnerabilities can best occupy, perform in, and redefine those 
roles.364 
This theory conceptualizes the role model as someone who can 
“provide[] a counternarrative intended to destabilize the narrative of 
exclusion that accompanied marginalization and devaluation of 
members of those groups.”365  This view of role models may better 
bolster the need to provide role models for minorities of the same racial 
group and substantiate a compelling interest for disparate impact. 
 
361. Addis, supra note 349, at 1406–07. 
362. Id. at 1405–06. 
363. Id. at 1406. 
364. Id. at 1409–10. 
365. Id. at 1410–11. 
NGOV.CORRECTED.PAGES_23.83.DOC 12/3/2010  11:47:58 AM 
2010] Battling for a Compelling Interest 63 
3.  Critiquing the Role Model Rationale 
Notwithstanding the benefits that may result from using racial 
classifications in disparate impact to provide role models, there are 
some limitations with applying the role model rationale in the 
employment context.  This section considers those limitations and 
concludes that the role model rationale risks disadvantaging minorities 
in the workplace. 
a.  Limited Application in Employment Context 
Like the diversity rationale, there may be limited use of the role 
model argument to justify racial classifications in the workforce.  First, 
the need to provide role models at work may be prevalent in higher-
ranked positions within an occupational field.  Common sense dictates 
that an emulator is generally interested in imitating the behavior of a 
role model whom the emulator perceives as being more successful or in 
a more advantageous position than the emulator.  Therefore, the role 
model argument is more applicable in occupations with a hierarchical 
structure. 
b.  Sending a Message of Inferiority and Being a Means to an End 
What may be of greater concern about the role model rationale for 
justifying racial classifications in disparate impact are the unintended 
negative consequences that may result.  As Professor Anita Allen 
eloquently pointed out, “One problem with the role model argument is 
that while it trumpets our necessity, it whispers our inferiority. . . . [T]he 
role model argument gives white males a reason for hiring minority 
women that is perfectly consistent with traditional assumptions of white 
male intellectual superiority.”366  Advancing a role model argument in 
the employment context risks the implication that minorities are 
intellectually inferior and unqualified for anything other than serving as 
a role model for minorities.367  This may perpetuate the feeling among 
minorities that they are undervalued.368 
The sense of being undervalued may be even more heightened if 
minority role models perceive themselves as a means to an end.369  The 
 
366. Anita L. Allen, On Being a Role Model, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 22, 37–38 (1990–
1991). 
367. Id. at 38–39. 
368. See id. at 39 (“Understandably, some black female academics resent the role model 
argument. We resent it in the way that we resent all faint praise. It undervalues.”). 
369. Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want 
to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1227 (1991). 
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employer may be advancing the role model rationale not to benefit the 
individual employee, but the employer.  Like the problem with the 
diversity argument, minority role models are sought out to serve a 
constituency that the employer seeks to reach. 
Another related problem with the role model argument is “it signals 
to [nonminorities] . . . that they may abandon efforts to serve as a 
positive role model for [minorities].”370  A reliance on minorities to 
serve as role models for other minorities suggests that it is a narrowly-
focused problem that only minorities can resolve. 
c.  Masking Discrimination 
Like the diversity argument, the role model justification poses 
another common threat to minorities—it has the potential to mask 
discrimination.  In Wygant, the Court warned that the role model 
rationale could be abused to warrant a school’s refusal to hire African-
American teachers based on the low enrollment of African-American 
students.371  Similar to the concern expressed in Wygant, an employer 
may use the role model theory to justify not hiring or promoting 
minorities to supervisory or other elevated positions when there are few 
minority employees.  Or, an employer may defend hiring or promoting a 
Caucasian over a minority because there is a greater percentage of 
Caucasians in need of a role model. 
Using the role model argument can be a double-edged sword in 
another respect.  While the role model argument can open opportunities 
for minorities who can serve as positive role models, it can 
concomitantly be used to reject minorities from jobs for not being 
positive role models.  Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club372 illustrates this 
exact problem.  In Chambers, the Girls Club trained its staff to act as 
role models for the girls served by the organization.373  As part of its 
role model approach, the Club instituted a policy of prohibiting 
employees from engaging in certain acts that would result in immediate 
discharge.374  Among the prohibitions were single parent 
pregnancies.375  The district court found that the policy had a disparate 
impact: “[B]ecause of the significantly higher fertility rate among black 
 
370. Allen, supra note 366, at 40. 
371. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). 
372. 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987). 
373. Id. at 699. 
374. Id. at 699 n.2 (“Negative role modeling for Girls Club Members [includes] such things as 
single parent pregnancies.”). 
375. Id. 
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females, the rule banning single pregnancies would impact black 
women more harshly.”376  However, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the policy against single parent pregnancies based on 
the role model theory and the employer’s business necessity for the 
policy.377  The court accepted the Girls Club’s assertion that single-
parent pregnancies among the Girls Club staff would send a message 
that the Girls Club condoned pregnancies among the girls it served.378  
Consequently, the likely potential for unintended consequences such as 
sending a message of inferiority to minorities, treating minorities as a 
means to an end, and masking discrimination undermine the role model 
rationale to justify disparate impact’s use of racial classifications. 
E.  Operational Need 
Additionally, the disparate impact provision might be shielded from 
an Equal Protection Clause challenge on the basis of operational need.  
The use of racial classification in disparate impact may be compelling if 
race is essential to the job. 
1.  Defining Operational Need 
The concepts of operational need, role modeling, and diversity are 
distinct, though sometimes used interchangeably by courts.  Operational 
need refers to an employer’s “need to carry out its mission 
effectively.”379  “Role models, in contrast, are people whose very 
existence conveys a feeling of possibility to others; they give hope that 
a previously restricted opportunity might now be available.”380  The 
diversity rationale relies on the positive effects generated by differences 
in racial background. 
2.  The Courts’ Responses to the Operational Need Rationale 
The Supreme Court has not decided a case involving a race-based 
employment practice justified on an operational need under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  In United States v. Paradise, the Supreme Court was 
presented with the argument that a diverse police force is necessary to 
foster community trust and facilitate law enforcement services by 
enhancing community cooperation.381  The Supreme Court, however, 
 
376. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 949 (D. Neb. 1986). 
377. Chambers, 834 F.2d at 701–02. 
378. Id. at 702–03. 
379. Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988). 
380. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
381. The Court avoided deciding this issue in United States v. Paradise: 
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did not address this operational needs rationale because evidence of past 
discrimination was sufficient to satisfy a compelling interest.382 
Although the Court has not decided this issue, it may be possible to 
glean from prior cases how the Court would respond to the operational 
need rationale.  It could be argued that Grutter and Ambach provide 
some optimism for the operational need rationale.  Some have argued 
that Grutter can be viewed to support racial diversity as an operational 
need when the government functions as an educator.383  This 
interpretation is based on the Court’s deference to the law school that 
“diversity is essential to its educational mission.”384  Even granting this 
interpretation, racial diversity may be an operational need that justifies 
race-conscious admissions procedures but may be insufficient to justify 
race-conscious employment decisions.  The distinction between using 
race to decide graduate school admission and to decide employment is 
important because of the implication of individual rights.  It may be 
acceptable to allow race-conscious decisions in Grutter to advance the 
 
Amici, the city of Birmingham, the city of Detroit, the city of Los Angeles, and the 
District of Columbia, state that the operations of police departments are crippled by the 
lingering effects of past discrimination. They believe that race-conscious relief in 
hiring and promotion restores community trust in the fairness of law enforcement and 
facilitates effective police service by encouraging citizen cooperation. [See also 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986)] (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]n a city with a recent history of racial unrest, the superintendent of police might 
reasonably conclude that an integrated police force could develop a better relationship 
with the community and do a more effective job of maintaining law and order than a 
force composed only of white officers”); [NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th 
Cir. 1974)] (“This is a police department and the visibility of the Black patrolman in 
the community is a decided advantage for all segments of the public at a time when 
racial divisiveness is plaguing law enforcement” (citation omitted)). Amicus NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., suggests that the governmental interest in a 
racially integrated Department is amplified here due to community perceptions of, and 
reactions to the Department’s historical role in defense of segregation and its active 
opposition to the civil rights movement. We need not decide if either the generalized 
governmental interest in effective law enforcement or the more particularized need to 
overcome any impediments to law enforcement created by perceptions arising from the 
egregious discriminatory conduct of the Department is compelling. In this case the 
judicial determinations of prior discriminatory policies and conduct satisfy the first 
prong of the strict scrutiny test. 
480 U.S. 149, 167 n.18 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
382. Id. 
383. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 966 (2008) (arguing 
that the government’s ability to function as an effective educator is diminished without racial 
diversity). 
384. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003); see Adams, supra note 383, at 966 
(arguing that Grutter supports an operational need argument because diversity is necessary to the 
educational mission of schools). 
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operational need of the university because education, let alone graduate 
education, is not a fundamental right.385  In contrast, the Court has 
recognized that persons have a fundamental right to earn their 
livelihood.386 
Additionally, Ambach could be viewed as an endorsement of an 
operational need rationale by the Court.  In Ambach, the Court believed 
it was necessary for teachers to be United States citizens to inculcate in 
students lessons about civics and citizenship.387  In effect, Ambach can 
be construed as endorsing an operational need argument—that the 
nationality of the teacher was essential to the educational mission of 
schools.  Ambach lends greater support than Grutter for extending the 
operational need argument to educators because at least in Ambach the 
Court addressed hiring decisions.  Even granting this interpretation of 
Ambach, at most it would support an operational need for employment 
decisions based on alienage and does not directly address race-based 
decisions.  Thus, construing Grutter and Ambach as accepting an 
operational need argument may not be directly applicable to 
employment. 
Among the lower courts, several circuits have reviewed and accepted 
race-based actions premised on an operational need in the fields of law 
enforcement and corrections.  In Barhold v. Rodriguez,388 while 
considering a challenge made by New York parole officers to the 
affirmative action plan used by the state division of parole, the Second 
Circuit recognized that an operational need could be a compelling 
interest for a “balanced workforce.”389 
Similarly, in Wittmer v. Peters, the Seventh Circuit endorsed 
operational need as a compelling interest when an African-American 
correctional officer was promoted on the basis of his race for a 
lieutenant’s position in a boot camp.390  The boot camp was an 
experimental program for young criminals to experience the “old-
 
385. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 3 (1973) (asserting that 
education is not a fundamental right). 
386. See Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 277–78 (1985) (discussing the right to earn a 
livelihood under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and finding that the practice of law is a 
fundamental right); Lester Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 371 (1978) 
(recognizing that Art. IV, § 2 protects a person’s right to “pursue a livelihood in a state other than 
his own”); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589–90 (1897) (“The ‘liberty’ mentioned in [the 
Fourteenth] amendment means . . . the right of the citizen . . . to live and work where he will; to 
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation . . . .”). 
387. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78–79 (1979). 
388. Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1988). 
389. Id. at 238. 
390. 87 F.3d 916, 917 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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fashioned military basic training, in which harsh regimentation, 
including drill-sergeant abuse by correctional officers, is used to break 
down and remold the character of the trainee.”391  The court upheld the 
race-based promotion, reasoning that “[t]he black lieutenant is needed 
because the black inmates are believed unlikely to play the correctional 
game of brutal drill sergeant and brutalized recruit unless there are some 
blacks in authority in the camp.”392 
Operational need has also been found to be a compelling interest in 
some cases involving law enforcement.  The Sixth Circuit endorsed an 
operational need rationale in Detroit Police Officers’ Association v. 
Young.393  In Young, the court upheld a voluntary affirmative action 
program implemented in the police department because minority 
officers were needed for effective community policing.394  The court 
opined, 
The argument that police need more minority officers is not simply 
that blacks communicate better with blacks or that a police department 
should cater to the public’s desires. Rather, it is that effective crime 
prevention and solution depend heavily on the public support and 
cooperation which result only from public respect and confidence in 
the police. In short, the focus is not on the superior performance of 
minority officers, but on the public’s perception of law enforcement 
officials and institutions.395 
The Fourth Circuit has echoed a similar rationale to advance the 
operational needs of the police.  In Talbert v. City of Richmond, the 
court upheld the city’s race-based promotion of officers to increase 
diversity within the police department that served a city with a 
population comprised of approximately 50% African-Americans.396 
Reiterating the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Young,397 the court 
concluded that the city had a legitimate purpose to consider race in 
addressing the “operational needs of an urban police department serving 
a multi-racial population.”398 
In Reynolds v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit upheld a race-
based promotion of a Hispanic officer on the justification of operational 
 
391. Id. 
392. Id. at 920. 
393. 608 F.2d 671, 695 (6th Cir. 1979). 
394. See id. at 696 (asserting that the community would have more trust in a police force with 
a higher percentage of minorities). 
395. Id. 
396. 648 F.2d 925, 928 (4th Cir. 1981). 
397. Id. at 931 (quoting Young, 608 F.2d at 695–96). 
398. Id. 
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need.399  The court accepted the city’s justification that it was necessary 
to promote minorities to lieutenant and captain positions because as 
“principal supervisors, . . . [t]hey set the tone for the department”400 and 
would help to “sensitize” non-Hispanic police officers “to any special 
problems in policing Hispanic neighborhoods.”401  The court concluded 
that “[e]ffective police work, including the detection and apprehension 
of criminals, requires that the police have the trust of that community 
and they are more likely to have it if they have ‘ambassadors’ to the 
community of the same ethnicity.”402 
In another case involving Chicago police officers, the Seventh Circuit 
reaffirmed in Petit v. City of Chicago that operational need could serve 
as a compelling interest.403  The court pointed out that having a diverse 
police force may be even more compelling in large metropolitan cities 
that are racially and ethnically divided.404  There was an operational 
need to have a diverse police force in Chicago because minorities in 
urban areas “are frequently mistrustful of police and are more willing 
than nonminorities to believe that the police engage in misconduct.”405  
As one expert explained, policing depends upon the cooperation of the 
community, which is negatively affected by lack of trust and confidence 
in the police.406  Increased minority representation in the police force, 
according to the expert, improves the community’s perception of the 
police’s crime-prevention and crime-solving abilities.407 
Not all circuits, however, have found an operational need to use 
racial classification for police work.408  Although the Second Circuit 
recognized operational need as a compelling interest in the penal 
context in Barhold, it did not accept this justification in a case involving 
law enforcement.  In Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of New York 
v. City of New York, the Second Circuit invalidated the city’s racially 
 
399. 296 F.3d 524, 530–31 (7th Cir. 2002). 
400. Id. at 529. 
401. Id. at 530. 
402. Id. 
403. 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003). 
404. Id. at 1114. 
405. Id. at 1115. 
406. Id. 
407. Id. 
408. The First Circuit was sympathetic to an operational needs argument in Cotter v. City of 
Boston but did not reach the issue.  323 F.3d 160, 172 n.10 (1st Cir. 2003) (“We need not reach 
the issue of whether avoiding litigation or meeting the operation needs of the [Police] Department 
are compelling state interests. . . . We are much more sympathetic to the argument that 
communities place more trust in a diverse police force and that the resulting trust reduces crime 
rates and improves policing.”). 
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motivated transfers of police officers that had been done in anticipation 
of community violence.409  In that case, police officers had beaten and 
tortured a Haitian immigrant.410  The community responded with public 
demonstrations, causing city officials to fear that the protests would 
degenerate into violence.411  As a result of this concern, the police 
department transferred black and Hispanic police officers to the 
precinct.412  The black and Hispanic police officers transferred to the 
precinct were subjected to insults and epithets from the community413 
and hostility by the precinct’s existing officers.414  Persuaded by expert 
testimony that cultural skills were more important to policing than race 
because African-American officers are “not necessarily better at 
policing black communities than white officers,”415 and by the lack of 
evidence to support a fear of community violence,416 the court 
invalidated the city’s transfers.417  The court explained, “The mere 
assertion of an ‘operational need’ to make race-conscious employment 
decisions does not, however, give a police department carte blanche to 
dole out work assignments based on race if no justification is 
established.”418 
While an operational need has been recognized in law enforcement 
work, it has not been extended to firefighters.  In Lomack v. City of 
Newark, the Third Circuit, in dicta, appeared to refuse to accept an 
operational need assertion for race-based transfers of firefighters.419  
Other circuits have not directly answered the question whether an 
operational need can be considered a compelling interest for a fire 
department to consider race in making employment decisions.420 
 
409. 310 F.3d 43, 44 (2d Cir. 2002). 
410. Id. at 47. 
411. Id. 
412. The word “black” is used here to be more inclusive than “African-American,” because 
some of the officers who were transferred identified themselves as African-American, Black-
Hispanic, Jamaican, West Indian, Trinidadian, or Guyanese.  See id. 
413. Id. at 48 (“[F]ar from being welcomed by black residents of the 70th Precinct, the 
transferred officers endured frequent insults and epithets from community members angry about 
the [Haitian immigrant’s] assault.”). 
414. Id. (“Several plaintiffs also testified to tensions with the other officers in the precinct, 
who viewed the new officers with suspicion, believing they were part of an NYPD internal affairs 
investigation into the 70th Precinct.”). 
415. Id. 
416. Id. at 53. 
417. Id. at 54. 
418. Id. at 52. 
419. 463 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Even if we were to liberally construe those assertions 
as an operational needs argument, however, utterly no evidence supports it.”). 
420. In McNamara v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit was confronted with this very issue 
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3.  Critiquing the Operational Need Rationale 
a.  Limited to Certain Occupations: Law Enforcement and Correctional 
Institutions 
The utility of the operational need rationale, like the diversity 
rationale, may be limited to certain contexts.  The Seventh Circuit, for 
example, has confined operational need to a “small window for forms of 
discrimination that are supported by compelling public safety concerns, 
such as affirmative action in the staffing of police departments and 
correctional institutions.”421 
But even within the occupations of law enforcement and corrections, 
there are limits to the application of operational need.  One 
circumstance that would necessitate using racial classification is in the 
instance of emergencies.  Justice Stevens specified his approval under 
such circumstances: 
[I]n a city with a recent history of racial unrest, the superintendent of 
police might reasonably conclude that an integrated police force could 
develop a better relationship with the community and thereby do a 
more effective job of maintaining law and order than a force 
composed only of white officers.422 
Justice Scalia similarly conditioned the use of race in emergencies 
only: 
At least where state or local action is at issue, only a social emergency 
rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb—for example, a 
prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates, . . . can 
justify an exception to the principle embodied in the Fourteenth 
Amendment that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows 
nor tolerates classes among citizens.”423 
 
but the insufficiency of the evidence at trial precluded the court’s determination of the issue.  138 
F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998).  Similarly, although Alexander v. Estepp raised the defense that 
the fire department’s affirmative action program was needed for “promoting more effective fire 
prevention and firefighting by fostering the trust of a diverse public,” the Fourth Circuit did not 
directly address this defense and invalidated the program because it was not narrowly tailored.  95 
F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 1996). 
421. Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 530 (7th Cir. 2002).  Arguments have been 
made that the operational need rationale should be applied to the military as well.  See Leach, 
supra note 308, at 1116–19 (arguing that the military is unique because of life and death 
consequences, where mistrust breeds delay or hesitation). 
422. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
423. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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Likewise, Justice Thomas concluded “that only those measures the State 
must take to provide a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence, 
will constitute a ‘pressing public necessity’”424 for racial classifications. 
One such social emergency that might have warranted racial 
preferences was the racial unrest of the 1960s.  During this time, there 
was racial tension in communities across America that erupted in 
violence.425  President Johnson created the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders (also known as the Kerner 
Commission) to study and make recommendations on the state of the 
nation’s civil unrest.426  The Commission recommended “[i]ncreasing 
communication across racial lines to destroy stereotypes, to halt 
polarization, end distrust and hostility, and create common ground for 
efforts toward public order and social justice.”427  To achieve these 
objectives, the Commission also recommended increasing the hiring of 
African-American police officers “to ensure that the police department 
is fully and visibly integrated” because a police department comprised 
mostly of Caucasians “can serve as a dangerous irritant; a feeling may 
develop that the community is not being policed to maintain civil peace 
but to maintain the status quo.”428 
In contrast, the situation in Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association did 
not necessitate the city’s racially based transfer of police officers.  
Although there were public protests in that case, protests do not 
necessarily lead to violence, as illustrated by the peaceful 
demonstrations led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.429  Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Association lacked the requisite urgency contemplated by 
Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas to justify racial classifications. 
 
424. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
425. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders recounted: “The summer of 1967 
again brought racial disorders to American cities, and with them shock, fear and bewilderment to 
the nation. The worst came during a two-week period in July, first in Newark and then in Detroit. 
Each set off a chain reaction in the neighboring communities.”  NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON 
CIVIL DISORDERS, SUMMARY REPORT 1 (1968) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE NAT’L ADVISORY 
COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, SUMMARY REPORT]; see also Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 
308, at 688–89 (describing the high level of violence in the 1960s). 
426. Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 308, at 689–90. 
427. REPORT OF THE NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, SUMMARY REPORT, 
supra note 425, at 20. 
428. Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 308, at 690 (quoting REPORT OF THE NAT’L ADVISORY 
COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 425, at 165). 
429. See David B. Filvaroff & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Origin and Enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 1, 28 (Bernard Grofman ed., 
2002) (describing Martin Luther King, Jr. as a “student of Gandhi who was able to instill in his 
followers his own commitment to nonviolence”). 
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The other circumstance where the operational need rationale in law 
enforcement and corrections would be most appropriate is where a 
person’s race is essential to the task at hand.  As Justice Stevens 
recognized, considerations of race may be appropriate when “an 
undercover agent is needed to infiltrate” a criminal group composed of 
the same race.430  For example, in Perez v. FBI, the Fifth Circuit 
approved of the use of racially based assignments of Hispanic agents to 
undercover assignments.431 
But while racial classifications may be necessary for some limited 
circumstances, the operational need for race-based actions is unlikely to 
justify disparate impact in most occupations.  Among the cases that 
upheld the operational need rationale, there was an asserted need that 
community safety depended upon race-conscious hiring decisions, 
either to enhance community cooperation or for authenticity in 
undercover investigations.  Aside from law enforcement and 
corrections, it would be difficult to find other occupations where public 
safety necessitates that an employee be of a particular race.  For 
example, firefighting is essential to public safety, but race-conscious 
hiring is not necessary to ensure community cooperation because the 
contact that firefighters have with the community differs from that of 
law enforcement.  Firefighters do not have the power and discretion that 
police officers have, which could be abused and lead to community 
distrust.  Additionally, the contacts that firefighters have with the 
community generally result from community initiated calls for 
emergencies like fires or vehicular accidents.  In contrast, although 
police officers respond to emergency calls, they are also on patrol duty, 
traffic duty, etc., where unsolicited contact may lead to resentment or 
distrust by the community members.  Likewise, ambulance services are 
also essential to public safety and dependent on community 
cooperation, but that cooperation is unlikely to be affected by the race 
of the ambulance drivers and emergency response personnel.  Because 
there are few occupations where racial tension affects community 
cooperation in ensuring public safety or where authenticity is necessary 
for investigations essential to public safety, the operational need 
rationale is inapplicable to most occupations. 
 
430. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
431. 707 F. Supp. 891, 912 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d, 956 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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b.  Similar to Using Race as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification 
i.  Legislative History and Jurisprudence Against Race as a BFOQ 
Using an operational need rationale to justify racial classifications in 
disparate impact raises another concern—it is the equivalent to the 
impermissible use of race as a bona fide occupational qualification 
(“BFOQ”).  Although Title VII prohibits discrimination, it allows for 
certain exceptions.  An employer may act “on the basis of religion, sex, 
or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or 
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise.”432  The BFOQ exception permits employment practices 
based on religion, sex, or national origin if religion, sex, or national 
origin is essential to the job.  A BFOQ “rests on the belief that there is 
something essential about the behavior . . . of the demographic 
group.”433 
Race was intentionally omitted from the list of exceptions to 
discrimination, and thus race cannot be a BFOQ.434  Congress 
entertained an amendment to add race as a BFOQ but ultimately 
rejected the amendment for fear that Caucasians could use race as a 
BFOQ to the exclusion of minorities.435 
Consistent with Title VII, courts have prohibited the use of race as a 
BFOQ.  One such case is Knight v. Nassau County Civil Service 
Commission.436  In Knight, the Second Circuit invalidated the county 
Civil Rights Commission’s involuntary transfer of an African-American 
 
432. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(e), 78 Stat. 241, 260 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000)). 
433. Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 308, at 681–82. 
434. See Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 615 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1980) (“This 
provision of Title VII permits intentional or unintentional discrimination where religion, sex or 
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification. Race is conspicuously absent from the 
exception; there the bare statute could lead one to conclude that there is no exception for either 
intentional or unintentional racial discrimination.”); Ray v. Univ. of Ark., 868 F. Supp. 1104, 
1126 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (“Thus, in certain limited circumstances, courts are to recognize the bona 
fide occupational qualification [“BFOQ”] defense. Race is conspicuously absent from the 
statutory exceptions. This was clearly not an oversight. The plain language of the statute thus 
precludes a race-based [BFOQ]. Courts have recognized that it is not irrational, but it is clearly 
forbidden by Title VII, to refuse on racial grounds to hire someone because your customers or 
clientele do not like his race.” (citations and internal alternations omitted)). 
435. Leach, supra note 308, at 1095 n.15 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2563 (1964)).  For a 
historical review of the development of the BFOQ exception, see Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 
308, at 685–86. 
436. 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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employee to the minority recruitment division.437  The Commission 
conceded that Knight’s race was a predominant factor in its decision to 
transfer him438 because it thought that Knight would more effectively 
develop a rapport with the minorities who were being recruited for civil 
service jobs.439  The court invalidated the Commission’s racially based 
assignment on the following basis: 
[The Commission’s employment decision] was based on a racial 
stereotype that blacks work better with blacks and on the premise that 
Knight’s race was directly related to his ability to do the job. No 
matter how laudable the Commission’s intention might be in trying to 
attract more minority applicants to the Civil Service[,] the fact remains 
that Knight was assigned a particular job (against his wishes) because 
his race was believed to specially qualify him for the work.440 
ii.  How an Operational Need Based on Race Is Similar to Using Race 
as a BFOQ 
Considerations of race as an operational need and race as a BFOQ 
stand as a constitutional and statutory paradox.  The lower courts have 
upheld the use of race as an operational need under the Equal Protection 
Clause in some circumstances, such as in Wittmer, Young, Talbert, 
Reynolds, and Petit, but have consistently invalidated the use of race as 
a BFOQ under Title VII, as seen in Knight.  It is, however, conceptually 
difficult to distinguish when race is permissibly used as an operational 
need and when it is impermissibly used as a BFOQ.  If there is a line 
between the two, one must need X-ray vision to see it because it can be 
argued that Wittmer, Young, Talbert, Reynolds, and Petit violated Title 
VII’s prohibition against using race as a BFOQ.  These cases relied on 
the same stereotypical notion, as in Knight, that persons will work more 
effectively with other members from their own racial group or that a 
person’s race is linked to that person’s abilities.  As Justice O’Connor 
stated, “Social scientists may debate how peoples’ thoughts and 
behavior reflect their background, but the Constitution provides that the 
Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals 
based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act 
or think.”441  The justification of operational need seems to assume that 
race or ethnicity determines how constituents will act or think. 
 
437. Id. at 159–60. 
438. Id. at 160. 
439. Id. at 162. 
440. Id. 
441. Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990), overruled by 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 225–27 (1995) (rejecting Metro 
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c.  Similar to Customer Preference as a BFOQ 
Another related problem is that race as an operational need is similar 
to the prohibited use of customer preference as a BFOQ.  The EEOC 
Guidelines prohibit the use of customer preference in hiring,442 which 
courts have enforced.  In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., the 
Fifth Circuit invalidated the airline’s exclusion of males from 
employment as cabin flight attendants.443  The airline, based on its 
considerable experience, believed that female flight attendants were 
superior at “providing reassurance to anxious passengers, giving 
courteous personalized service and, in general, making flights as 
pleasurable as possible within the limitations imposed by aircraft 
operations.”444  Additionally, the trial court was persuaded by the 
evidence that the airline passengers “overwhelmingly preferred to be 
served by female stewardesses.”445  The airline presented expert 
testimony of a psychiatrist who found that the unique environment of an 
airplane cabin required consideration of the psychological needs of its 
passengers, which was better met by female attendants.446  Despite the 
evidence, the Fifth Circuit held that the airline was prohibited from 
allowing customer preference to be used in its hiring decisions.447 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has rejected an attempt to use customer 
preference to justify gender discrimination on the basis of a BFOQ.  In 
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., the employer asserted that its South 
American clients preferred to conduct business transactions with a male 
Director of International Operations and would refuse to interact with a 
female holding this position.448  Notwithstanding the employer’s claims 
that hiring a female director would “destroy the essence” of the 
employer’s business or “create serious safety and efficacy problems,”449 
the Ninth Circuit held that customer preference cannot justify the 
employer’s discriminatory action.450 
 
Broadcasting’s use of intermediate scrutiny to review some benign racial classifications and 
broadly applying strict scrutiny to all federal racial classifications). 
442. “The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, the employer, 
clients or customers,” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (2010), “do[es] not warrant the application of 
the bona fide occupational qualification exception,” id. § 1604.2(a)(1). 
443. 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971). 
444. Id. at 387 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
445. Id. 
446. Id. 
447. Id. at 389. 
448. 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981). 
449. Id. 
450. Id. at 1277. 
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Although the prohibition against relying on customer tastes to dictate 
hiring decisions applies specifically to sex, it would apply more so to 
race because race is not even a permissible BFOQ.  Ray v. University of 
Arkansas451 illustrates an impermissible attempt to base employment 
decisions on customers’ racial preferences.452  In Ray, the court 
invalidated the firing of a white security officer in a predominately 
black university; the termination occurred because the employer 
believed that “a white officer would be perceived negatively by a 
portion of his constituent community which, in turn, could lead to racial 
responses and confrontations.”453  The court held that some students’ 
“predisposition of racial animus toward white officers . . . [is a] form of 
‘client’ preference [that] is no more permissible than any other, and will 
not justify the different treatment of white officers.”454 
As Ray demonstrates, using race as an operational need is similar to 
using customers’ racial preferences as a BFOQ.  When race is accepted 
as an operational need, there is a reliance on the preference of the 
customers, whether they are in the form of consumers, constituency, or 
community members.455  Wittmer relied on the preference of the 
African-American criminals whose cooperation depended upon the 
presence of an African-American drill sergeant.  Young, Talbert, 
Reynolds, and Petit relied on the preference of the minority community 
members who preferred to cooperate with minority officers.  In fact, 
Young and Talbert emphasized that the police department’s 
employment decisions focused on the “public’s perception of law 
enforcement officials and institutions,”456 and Reynolds and Petit 
stressed the belief that increased minority representation in the police 
force improves the public’s perception and willingness to work with the 
police.457  The focus of the police department in Young, Talbert, 
 
451. 868 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Ark. 1994). 
452. The Fifth Circuit was also faced with a case of an employer using customer preference to 
make race-based decisions.  In EEOC v. Olson’s Diary Queens, Inc., the employer defended its 
hiring decisions based on a perceived customer preference “to be served by persons of their own 
‘culture.’”  989 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 1993).  The Fifth Circuit dismissed, without much 
discussion, the employer’s attempt to use customers’ racial preference as a justification.  Id. 
453. Ray, 868 F. Supp. at 1126. 
454. Id. at 1126–27. 
455. One court has rebutted this argument, relying on the city of Detroit’s history of racial 
unrest to approve the Detroit Police Department’s operational needs defense for using racial 
quotas.  See Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 995–1003 (D.C. Mich. 1979), aff’d sub 
nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983).  This case, however, occurred 
during a time of unyielding racial tension in Detroit. 
456. Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 931 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Young); Detroit 
Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 (6th Cir. 1979). 
457. See Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that lack of 
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Reynolds, and Petit on the public’s perception is akin to a concession 
that the police department was guided by its constituents’ preference for 
race.  Therefore, even if using race as an operational need would satisfy 
a compelling interest, which the Supreme Court has not yet decided, it 
would violate the statutory prohibition against using race and EEOC 
Guidelines against using customer preference as BFOQ exceptions to 
discrimination. 
d.  Adverse Effects of Operational Need Rationale 
The last problem with race as an operational need is that it could, like 
diversity, be used for pretextual discrimination and to disproportionately 
burden minorities.  For example, in Perez v. FBI, Hispanic agents were 
disproportionately assigned to wiretaps because of their language 
skills.458  These wiretap assignments posed particular hardships, 
requiring agents to be confined to a vehicle or listening room with 
limited movement for eight to twelve hours,459 and had a negative 
impact on promotions.460  The FBI argued that the assignments were 
based on its need for the Hispanic officers’ special language skills.461  
The court held that “[t]he protection of the public safety and welfare 
[did] not justify the discriminatory practices demonstrated at trial.”462  
As Perez demonstrates, minorities whose race is perceived to be 
essential to a job may risk bearing the burden of dangerous or 
undesirable assignments. 
Similarly, in Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, African-American 
police officers were assigned to patrol a zone consisting predominately 
of African-American residents and businesses.463  The police chief 
rationalized the assignment with his belief that African-American 
officers “are better able to cope” with African-American residents who 
may act with hostility toward police officers.464  Additionally, the 
police chief believed African-American police officers can more 
effectively communicate with African-American residents, identify 
 
confidence in police officers may negatively affect the willingness of community residents to 
cooperate with non-minority officers); see also Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 530 
(7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that non-minority police officers may be “less likely to be sensitized 
to any specific problems” in minority communities). 
458. 707 F. Supp. 891, 907 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d, 956 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1992). 
459. Id. at 909. 
460. Id. at 910. 
461. Id. 
462. Id. 
463. 400 F.2d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1968). 
464. Id. 
NGOV.CORRECTED.PAGES_23.83.DOC 12/3/2010  11:47:58 AM 
2010] Battling for a Compelling Interest 79 
members of their own race, and investigate criminal activities in 
African-American neighborhoods than Caucasian officers.465  The Fifth 
Circuit invalidated the police department’s practice of race-based 
assignments, holding that the argument that “Negro officers are better 
able to police Negro citizens cannot justify the blanket assignment of all 
Negroes . . . .”466 
Likewise, in Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte, the police 
department disproportionately assigned African-American and Hispanic 
officers to patrol the high-crime, high-risk neighborhoods that were 
more stressful and dangerous than the assignments that Caucasian 
officers endured.467  The department explained that the officers were 
assigned according to “the relative importance that they may have in 
different types of neighborhoods.”468  The court found this justification 
to be based on racial stereotypes and invalidated the department’s 
assignment practices.469 
Additionally, even if race is an operational need, there is a potential 
that it could be applied to rationalize the exclusion of minorities, as 
Congress had feared when it rejected allowing race as a BFOQ.  The 
same rationale in Wittmer, Young, Talbert, Petit, and Reynolds that 
allowed race to justify the hiring and promotion of minorities could 
equally be applied to their disadvantage.  Assume in Wittmer that the 
Caucasian inmates refused to play the drill sergeant game with an 
African-American officer.  The operational need rationale would 
support the hiring of a Caucasian officer for the role of drill sergeant.  
Or assume in Young, Talbert, Petit, and Reynolds that the community 
was entirely composed of Caucasians and that Caucasians distrusted and 
refused to cooperate with minority officers.  In this situation, too, the 
operational need rationale would justify hiring Caucasian officers. 
Finally, as the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reminds us, a 
reliance on an operational needs argument for racially-based 
employment decisions has the potential to undermine the progress that 
minorities have achieved.  In 1984, the Commission issued a statement 
relating to the case of Vanguard Justice Society, Inc. v. Hughes, which 
involved the City of Detroit’s use of racial quotas within its police 
department.470  The Commission warned: 
 
465. Id. 
466. Id. at 301. 
467. 553 F. Supp. 601, 610 (D. Conn. 1983). 
468. Id. at 611. 
469. Id. 
470. 592 F. Supp. 245, 272–73 & n.88 (D. Md. 1984). 
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The city asserts that the promotion quota was necessary to increase 
black police officers at all ranks, in order to achieve more effective 
law enforcement and reduce discriminatory treatment against black 
citizens. This amounts to little more than a claim that only black 
police officers can effectively provide law enforcement services to 
black citizens or supervise lower-ranking black officers. Such a claim 
has no place in a free, pluralistic society. If accepted, it would justify a 
claim that members of a racial or ethnic group can be properly served 
or treated only by members of that group. This would turn the clock 
back to the “separate but equal” days of the past, when public entities 
dispensed benefits, entitlements, and penalties of all kinds on the basis 
of a person’s skin color.471 
Therefore, using race as an operational need poses many of the same 
problems as diversity: reliance on stereotypes, potential for exclusion of 
minorities, and potential for minorities to shoulder the burden at a 
particular job.  These problems pose significant obstacles to justify a 
compelling interest in using racial classifications in disparate impact. 
F.  Removing Barriers to Employment 
One last defense that might protect Title VII’s disparate impact 
provision against an Equal Protection Clause challenge is the 
compelling interest of removing barriers to employment.  This section 
discusses the historical context and legislative intent of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.  This section also 
examines whether the goal of removing barriers to employment is 
sufficient to sustain the disparate impact provision’s racial 
classifications. 
1.  What is the Government’s Purpose? 
As early as Griggs, the Court recognized that “[t]he objective of 
Congress in [the] enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of 
the statute.  It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and 
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable 
group of . . . employees over other employees.”472  The intent of 
Congress, as the Griggs Court explained, was not to “command[] that 
the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply because 
of minority origins.  Far from disparaging job qualifications as such, 
Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so that 
race . . . become[s] irrelevant.”473  Ricci reiterated “the important 
 
471. Id. 
472. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971). 
473. Id. at 436. 
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purpose of Title VII—that the workplace be an environment free of 
discrimination, where race is not a barrier to opportunity.”474 
Congress, however, may not have had disparate impact theory in 
mind when it enacted Title VII.475  Congress had amended the Act 
several times since its initial passage in 1964,476 but Congress did not 
expressly authorize disparate impact claims until the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.  Consequently, some argue that Congress’s sole concern was with 
intentional discrimination when it enacted Title VII.477  Regardless of 
whether Congress originally intended the disparate impact theory when 
it enacted the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, Congress’s 
subsequent adoption of Griggs and codification of disparate impact in 
the 1991 amendment evinces intent for disparate impact to serve as an 
additional means of effectuating the Act’s intent—removing barriers 
and providing equal employment opportunities. 
 
474. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009). 
475. See Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the 
Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 223, 223 
(1990) (“The Act, however, remains silent about whether it is also concerned with facially neutral 
employment practices, adopted without a discriminatory motive, that adversely affect the 
employment opportunities of racial minorities and women. The legislative history of Title VII, as 
originally enacted, is inconclusive on this issue.”); Browne, supra note 70, at 293 (“The language 
of Title VII does not easily lend itself to the disparate-impact theory. Likewise, nothing in the 
legislative history supports the assertion that the 1964 Congress in any way intended to outlaw 
job qualifications that were not intended to discriminate. In fact, the relevant legislative history 
suggests the contrary.”); Michael E. Gold, Grigg’s Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and 
Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation 
for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 492 (1985) (arguing that Congress did not intend to regulate 
non-intentional discrimination when enacting Title VII and that employment discrimination 
should be analyzed according to intent); Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) 
on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) (“Title VII . . . 
suggest[s] that liability is premised on improper motivation. Little in the language of the Act and 
even less from its legislative history suggests that liability can be premised solely on the effect a 
selection device has on a class protected by the statute.”); Rutherglen, supra note 172, at 1298 
(“Only under an extremely strained interpretation can the [principal prohibitions of Title VII] be 
forced to yield an explicit prohibition against neutral practices with adverse impact.”). 
476. Congress amended the Civil Rights Act in 1972, expanding Title VII to cover private and 
governmental employers.  ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 155, at 15.  In 1978, Congress 
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.  Id. at 
731; see Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 275 (1987) (deciding whether the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 preempts state statute regarding leave and reinstatement 
for pregnancy). 
477. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 475, at 492 (arguing that Congress’s sole intent in enacting 
Title VII was to prohibit intentional discrimination by employers). 
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2.  Determining Whether Removing Employment Barriers and 
Providing Equal Employment Opportunities Is Compelling 
Is a governmental interest in removing barriers and providing equal 
employment opportunities compelling to justify the disparate impact 
provision’s racial classifications?  The Constitution does not provide a 
direct answer to this question because the Constitution does not 
explicitly define compelling interests or provide the weight to be 
accorded to particular interests.478  Turning to whether Congress has the 
power to act does not answer the query because “[t]he mere existence of 
a power is an insufficient basis for finding a compelling interest.”479  
The governmental powers rationale is inadequate to support an 
inference of compelling governmental interests because statutes’ 
original objectives may have “become irrelevant or unattainable, or 
changed circumstances may have created unintended consequences for 
application of the original expectation that such statutes were 
proper.”480  For example, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, it chose to act under the authority of the Commerce Clause 
because The Civil Rights Cases: United States v. Stanley481 led 
Congress to believe that the Fourteenth Amendment would be a tenuous 
basis for congressional authority.482  In The Civil Rights Cases, the 
Court held that Congress lacked the power to enact legislation 
regulating private conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment.483  Acting 
under the Commerce Clause, Congress succeeded.  In Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States484 and Katzenbach v. McClung,485 the Court 
upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964.486  In this instance, because the 
Commerce Clause was not Congress’s initial choice of powers to 
sustain the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a reliance on the governmental 
 
478. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but 
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 919 (1988) 
(“[C]ompelling interests lack a strong textual foundation in the Constitution.”). 
479. Id. at 938. 
480. Id. at 939. 
481. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
482. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 168 (3d ed. 2009). 
483. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11. 
484. 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). 
485. 379 U.S. 294, 300–04 (1964). 
486. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was invalidated as applied to private conduct, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 contained provisions similar to the 1875 Act.  See J. Morgan Kousser, 
What Light Does the Civil Rights Act of 1875 Shed on the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, in LEGACIES 
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 33 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2002) (highlighting, for example, that 
the 1875 Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 both contained provisions providing for the full 
and equal enjoyment of public accommodations). 
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powers rationale to determine compelling interests would be misguided.  
Rather, more reliable sources of governmental purpose may be found in 
the “rights described in the constitutional text, penumbras, and means to 
constitutionally specified ends.”487 
“[C]ertain explicitly guaranteed rights may provide a firmer basis for 
finding a compelling governmental interest than either purposes or 
powers.”488  For example, rights to life, liberty, and property may 
justify inferences of compelling governmental interests because of their 
explicit description in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments.489  
Additionally, an “obligation of equality, which is explicitly developed 
in five amendments,”490 including the Fourteenth Amendment, may 
support an inference of compelling governmental interests. 
An inference that Title VII’s disparate impact provision serves a 
compelling governmental interest may be made because the provision 
protects explicitly guaranteed liberty and equality rights.  As the Court 
has recognized, the right to earn a livelihood is a liberty interest.491  
Title VII’s disparate impact provision advances this liberty interest 
through its objective in removing barriers to employment.  The 
provision also protects the right to equality by prohibiting employment 
discrimination, regardless of employer intent, and thereby provides for 
equal employment opportunities. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 advances the same 
egalitarian interests as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
because the two were created to address similar social injustice.  
Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment to respond to the post-
Civil War discrimination directed at former slaves.  After the Civil War, 
southern states discriminated against former slaves by passing Black 
Codes492 that restricted full exercise of their liberty493 and “imposed a 
 
487. Gottlieb, supra note 478, at 937. 
488. Id. at 939. 
489. Id. 
490. Id. 
491. See supra note 386 and accompanying text (describing the Constitutional basis of the 
right to earn a livelihood as a liberty interest). 
492. The Codes prohibited African-Americans from renting land, prevented “servants from 
leaving their masters’ premises” and authorized the arrest and return of African-Americans who 
breached labor contracts to their employers.  DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 425 (2d ed. 2005); see also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS 
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CONTEXT 677 (2d ed. 2006) (providing excerpts from 
Louisiana’s “Black Code” for regulating Freedmen); HOWARD N. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT 
THAT REFUSED TO DIE 86 (2000) (discussing the “Black Codes, which the states passed to limit 
the freedom of movement of the newly emancipated after the Civil War . . . .”). 
493. See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 492, at 703 (“To address the deprivations of civil rights 
NGOV.CORRECTED.PAGES_23.83.DOC 12/3/2010  11:47:58 AM 
84 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 42 
second-class status just short of slavery on blacks.”494  In response, 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 to void the Black Codes 
and protect the civil rights of African-Americans.495  At this time, 
Congress also drafted the Fourteenth Amendment,496 one of the Civil 
War or Reconstruction-Era Amendments, to address the prevailing 
discrimination against former slaves after the Civil War.497  “One 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to ‘constitutionalize’ the 
Civil Rights Act . . . .”498  The Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 were “inextricably linked . . . , since section one was 
added to the amendment at least in part to remove doubts about the 
constitutionality of the 1866 act.”499 
The vision of equality for African-Americans that fueled the drafting 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment also 
gave rise to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  When the states ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the plight of African-Americans did not end.  
As the Reconstruction Era came to a close, many states adopted “Jim 
Crow laws” that discriminated against African-Americans by requiring 
separation of the races, such as segregation in public accommodations, 
transportation, and schools.500  In response, Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to eliminate segregation in public places and 
 
and civil liberties in the post-Civil War South, Congress passed a series of civil statutes . . . .”). 
494. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 43 (2d ed. 1995). 
495. CURTIS ET AL., supra note 492, at 678; NELSON, supra note 494, at 48. 
496. CURTIS ET AL., supra note 492, at 678. 
497. HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM & THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS & 
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (8th ed. 2003) (“[Congress] wanted to do something to 
ameliorate the lot of blacks; . . . they intended to embody the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, forbidding ‘discrimination in civil rights or immunities . . . on account of race’ . . . ; at least 
to some extent they were concerned with civil rights generally . . . .”); RANDY E. BARNETT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT 264 (2008) (“It is generally accepted that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was formulated to ensure that Congress had the power to enact this 
legislation, and to prevent a future repeal of the protections contained in the Civil Rights Act.”); 
WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN OVERVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND 
INTEGRATION 261 (2004) (“The Fourteenth Amendment is one of the three Reconstruction-Era 
amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments) that abolished slavery and 
resolved other slavery and Civil War-related issues.”); JOHN C. KNECHTLE & CHRISTOPHER J. 
ROEDERER, MASTERING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 114 (2009); David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House 
Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333, 337 (2003) (“The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution was adopted to deal with the aftermath of slavery and the racial discrimination that 
prevailed after the Civil War.”). 
498. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 492, at 429; see also NELSON, supra note 494, at 3 
(discussing an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
purpose was “to concretize in constitutional law the right to equality and other rights . . . .”). 
499. NELSON, supra note 494, at 104. 
500. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 482, at 765. 
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blatantly discriminatory employment practices.501  Specifically, “[Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act] reflect[ed] Congress’s concern with the 
problem of racism in American labor markets, and with the failure of 
the descendants of those brought to America as slaves to achieve 
economic equality.”502  Therefore, their parallel origins and purpose of 
protecting liberty and equality rights harmonize Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment, fortifying the 
inference that Title VII’s disparate impact provision serves a compelling 
interest. 
3.  How the Disparate Impact Provision Eliminates Barriers and 
Provides Equal Employment Opportunities 
Congress’s vision for eliminating barriers and providing equal 
employment opportunities might not have included the disparate impact 
theory at Title VII’s conception, but the disparate impact provision 
achieves Title VII’s objective nonetheless.  The disparate impact 
provision removes barriers by ensuring that business practices lacking 
business necessity and job relatedness do not deprive any racial group 
of employment opportunities.  Disparate impact’s racial classifications 
may be justified because they are needed to determine if such a barrier 
exists.  But the existence of such a barrier alone is not the basis of 
liability—it merely prompts an inquiry into the business practice.  
Rather, liability results only when an employer fails to show business 
necessity and job relatedness, or when the employer refuses to use a less 
adverse alternative that still serves the needs of the employer.503  The 
consequence of finding an employer in violation of the disparate impact 
provision means simply that the employer may not use the selection 
criterion or employment practice at issue.504  The disparate impact 
provision does not substantially interfere with an employer’s 
 
501. See LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 1 (Bernard Grofman ed., Univ. Press of 
Va. 2002) (“[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . broke once and for all the Jim Crow legacy of the 
post-Reconstruction South and largely ended the overt and legally sanctioned forms of 
discrimination against blacks . . . .”). 
502. ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 155, at 4. 
503. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009) (explaining that an employer may 
defend itself against liability for employment discrimination if the employer can show the 
practice is job related for the position at issue, a business necessity, and that there is no available 
alternative that has less disparate impact). 
504. See Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 473 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (“The 
plaintiff in a disparate impact case may seek only equitable relief such as injunctive and 
declaratory relief, reinstatement to a position and back pay, and a jury trial is not mandated.  42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (compensatory and punitive damages not available in disparate impact 
case); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (providing for equitable relief under Title VII).”), aff’d, 370 F.3d 
565 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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prerogatives because the employer is free to explore other selection 
methods.  Additionally, the employer is not subject to compensatory or 
punitive damages as in disparate treatment cases.505  Consequently, it is 
difficult to justify an employer’s insistence to continue a business 
practice that adversely affects racial groups when there is no business 
necessity or when there are equally effective alternatives that have less 
adverse effect. 
Although 
Congress did not intend by Title VII . . . to guarantee a job to every 
person regardless of qualifications, . . . [w]hat is required by Congress 
is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on 
the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.506 
A business practice that causes an adverse impact but not invidious 
discrimination is nonetheless an artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary 
barrier if there is no business necessity for that practice or other 
alternatives exist that will meet the employer’s needs but have less 
adverse effect.  By eliminating business practices unnecessarily causing 
an adverse impact, the disparate impact provision removes racial 
barriers and thereby serves to achieve equality in employment 
opportunities. 
CONCLUSION: PEACE TREATY? 
The intent of this Article was to do as Justice Scalia advised—to 
“begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace 
 
505. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981(a)); Bacon, 205 F.R.D. at 473; Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 
F.R.D. 230, 237 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (“[I]n a Title VII disparate impact case, the employee may 
seek only equitable relief, to include back pay; no damages are permitted.”); Judith J. Johnson, 
Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Resuscitate the “Reasonable Factors 
Other Than Age” Defense and the Disparate Impact Theory, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1399, 1439 
(2004) (“Remedies in disparate impact cases remain exclusively equitable under Title VII . . . .”); 
Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 193 (2003) 
(“[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides for compensatory and punitive damages in 
employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when 
plaintiffs prove that the defendant ‘engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination,’ while 
providing equitable relief alone for plaintiffs who show only a disparate impact.”); Gerald A. 
Madek, Tax Treatment of Damages Awarded for Age Discrimination, 12 AKRON TAX J. 161, 164 
(1996) (“Title VII allows only for equitable relief for successful disparate impact claims and not 
for compensatory or punitive damages.”). 
506. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973) (quoting Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971)), aff’d, 528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976), superceded 
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Dare 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987 (D. Minn. 2003). 
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between”507 disparate impact and Equal Protection before the war that 
he predicted occurs.  If we agree that disparate impact uses racial 
classifications, then disparate impact is vulnerable to attack by an Equal 
Protection Clause challenge.  Title VII’s disparate impact provision may 
be defended by asserting that it remedies past discrimination, smokes 
out discrimination, enhances diversity, provides role models, or meets 
an operational need.  None of these defenses, however, provide a 
compelling interest for the disparate impact provision.  The diversity, 
role model, and operational need rationales are inadequate defenses 
because they can be manipulated to exploit minorities as means to an 
end.  These three rationales do not focus on advancing the interests of 
the individual employees, but rather on facilitating working relations 
with racial groups in order to increase efficiency and maximize 
employer profits.  They are employer-centered rationales.  These 
justifications also risk subjecting minorities to pretextual discrimination, 
perpetuating stereotypes, and excluding minorities from employment 
opportunities. 
The smoking out discrimination and remedial need rationales are the 
most faithful to Griggs and the purpose of Title VII because they focus 
on opening opportunities for individuals.  However, the smoking out 
intentional discrimination justification seems antithetical to disparate 
impact because disparate impact does not rely on intent.  Additionally, 
the smoking out unconscious bias justification is undermined by 
inconclusive implicit bias research that is subject to contradictory 
interpretations. 
The remedial need rationale offers a stronger justification for 
disparate impact’s reliance on racial classification because the remedial 
need rationale has long been accepted by the Supreme Court.  The 
remedial need rationale, however, may provide the narrowest protection 
for disparate impact.  The remedial need rationale is dependent on 
showing that an employer previously discriminated.  It is unlikely that, 
when the government enforces the disparate impact provision, it can 
trace back instances of prior constitutional or statutory violations by the 
particular employer. 
This search for a compelling interest has revealed that these 
justifications—remedying past discrimination, smoking out 
discrimination, enhancing diversity, providing role models, and meeting 
an operational need—are likely insufficient to serve as a compelling 
interest after consideration of their shortcomings.  A rationale advanced 
 
507. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2683 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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to support disparate impact’s use of racial classifications must be an 
impenetrable defense in light of the government’s use of a “highly 
suspect tool”508 like racial classification. 
Removing barriers to employment, however, might be the strongest 
defense for the disparate impact provision because it protects liberty and 
equality rights.  The disparate impact provision removes arbitrary and 
unnecessary barriers to employment by eliminating business practices 
that adversely impact racial groups without a business justification or 
where there are equally effective alternatives with less adverse effect.  
In this way, the provision affords people economic liberty and equality 
by allowing them to attain their livelihood without unnecessary racial 
barriers.  Ironically, what potentially could have led to the disparate 
impact provision’s destruction could lead to its defense—the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act can be harmonized by the 
commonality of their origins and purpose in protecting liberty and 
equality rights.  Thus, when the war is waged between the Equal 
Protection Clause and Title VII’s disparate impact provision, peace 
might be made between the two through the compelling interest of 
achieving equal employment opportunity through the removal of 
barriers. 
 
508. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
